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ABSTRACT 
For the last decade, the European Union (EU) has been 
reconceptualizing its corporate restructuring framework with the 
hope of bolstering capital markets and improving cross-border 
lending.  Unfortunately, the system remains plagued by two 
intractable problems:  divergent substantive law at the Member 
State level and jurists unaccustomed to guiding reorganization 
cases.  The result is a system beset by uncertainty and disparate 
treatment.  The EU is intent on addressing these problems, but 
progress has been elusive.  The EU must work through 
recommendations and directives to encourage Member States to 
align substantive restructuring law with policy design.  But Member 
States have been unresponsive to the EU’s recent efforts.  The 
prospect of addressing these intractable problems in the foreseeable 
future is grim.  Therefore, this Article breaks with current 
scholarship and urges the EU to adopt a radical alternative.  The EU 
should consider making legal and structural changes that will 
facilitate bankruptcy tourism.  I argue that affording corporations 
increased discretion as to the location of restructuring cases will aid 
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in creating judicial hubs of optimal law and experienced jurists.  The 
EU has the power to adopt my recommendations by simply 
modifying its own law and procedure, which should accelerate 
implementation timelines. 
Ultimately, a global financial correction is underway.  The EU’s 
restructuring framework is unprepared to offer predictable and 
comprehensive reorganization outcomes for the new wave of 
distressed corporations.  This Article proposes a novel vantage point 
from which to assess policy alignment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Frank Lorenzo—chairman of Continental Airlines—sat 
in his opulent Houston office and fumed.  The crisis in the Persian 
Gulf had caused oil prices to spike, squeezing Continental’s margins 
and crippling the company’s ability to service its $2.2 billion debt 
burden.1  Lenders were unwilling to renegotiate the debt.2  Lorenzo 
needed massive concessions from the company’s labor unions, but 
he had a vitriolic relationship with his employees.3  Labor unions 
regarded him as pure evil. 4   The prospect of an amicable 
compromise was abysmal. 
A bankruptcy filing was Continental’s only option.  At that time, 
few large corporations viewed bankruptcy as a way to rehabilitate a 
struggling business.  Rather, bankruptcy was seen as an act of 
suicide, with the bankruptcy court tasked with conducting the post-
mortem and disposing of the body.  But Lorenzo had taken 
Continental Airlines through bankruptcy in the early 1980s and 
understood that the process offered the possibility of meaningful 
value preservation and debt alleviation.5 
Unfortunately, there was another problem to consider.  At that 
time, troubled businesses invariably filed their bankruptcy cases in 
the city in which their home office was located.  Indeed, the first 
Continental bankruptcy case had been filed in Houston.6  Lorenzo 
was troubled by the prospect of the second bankruptcy case landing 
there. 7   Judge Wheless had overseen the first Continental 
bankruptcy case and ruled in the debtor’s favor in ostensibly every 
significant matter. 8   However, after the company emerged from 
bankruptcy, Judge Wheless presided over the personal bankruptcy 
 
 1 See Agis Salpukas, Continental Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, 
at A1. 
 2 See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING: THE EPIC CONTEST FOR POWER AND 
PROFITS THAT PLUNGED THE AIRLINES INTO CHAOS 214 (1995). 
 3 Id. at 216-19. 
 4 See Cindy Skrzycki, For Frank Lorenzo, Controversy is Business as Usual, WASH.  
POST, March 9, 1989, at A14. 
 5 See PETZINGER, supra note 2, at 243-44. 
 6 See LYNN LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 58 (2005). 
 7 Id. at 59 
 8 Id. 
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cases of the pilots that had participated in the labor strike against 
Continental and whom the company had refused to hire back. 9  
After witnessing the devastation from Lorenzo’s personal vendettas, 
Judge Wheless had gone so far as to describe Continental as “Attila 
the Hun.”10 
Frank Lorenzo needed to find a different venue for Continental’s 
second bankruptcy case.  He understood that the federal bankruptcy 
code’s venue provision was woefully ambiguous.  The right judge 
could construe the provision in a way that would allow Continental 
to forum shop.  This type of maneuvering required an 
accommodating jurist.  Continental found such a jurist in the 
Delaware bankruptcy court.11 
Judge Helen Balick was the only bankruptcy judge in Delaware 
at that time.12  And she had a light caseload.  From 1980 to 1989, only 
one large publicly held company filed for bankruptcy in Delaware.13  
The vast majority of Fortune 500 companies were—and still are—
incorporated in Delaware, but only a few have any meaningful 
connection to the state and even less are headquartered there.14  In 
1990, the Delaware bankruptcy court lacked the prominence of the 
Delaware chancery courts, which adjudicated the most complex 
business law disputes in the country.  The Continental bankruptcy 
case was an opportunity for Judge Balick to redefine how the 
corporate bankruptcy market viewed her court.  She seized that 
opportunity. 
Over the course of the case, Judge Balick demonstrated an 
unprecedented conviction to fulfill the requests made by the 
debtor’s management team.  She issued injunctions to stop 
 
 9  Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. at 60-61.  By the time the bankruptcy case was filed, Lorenzo had sold 
his controlling ownership interest in Continental but remained on the board of 
directors.  Id. at 58-59. 
 12 Ann Davis, Judges Are Added to Bench in Delaware Bankruptcy Court, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 5, 1997, 12:01AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB855096666622716500 [https://perma.cc/TT36-
9BCV]. 
 13  UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu 
[https://perma.cc/PDF6-HP7W].   
 14 See Delaware Division of Corporations, About the Division of Corporations, 
DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2PY-T2ZT]. 
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troublesome litigation in other jurisdictions and forbade attorneys 
from appearing in other courts to seek relief against Continental.15  
Many of her rulings were devoid of any supporting basis.16  She 
received rebukes from more senior and experienced jurists in other 
jurisdictions.17  Judge Balick was not always successful in fulfilling 
Continental’s requests, but the underlying premise of her conduct 
was clear:  she would not allow the Continental case to be 
transferred from her court—even though pieces of the first case were 
still being litigated in Judge Wheless’ court in Houston—or 
countenance any party undermining the restructuring objectives of 
Continental’s management.18  Ultimately, Judge Balick staked out 
positions adopted by no bankruptcy court before her19 and virtually 
all of her actions were decidedly debtor friendly.20 
The result was a powerful signal to the bankruptcy bar.  The 
Continental case became the fountainhead for a new way of 
conceptualizing the bankruptcy process and venue.  After receiving 
only one bankruptcy case involving a large publicly held company 
from 1980 to 1989, the Delaware bankruptcy court oversaw forty-
one such cases from 1991 to 1996. 21   In just seven years, the 
overlooked Delaware bankruptcy court had become the most 
prominent bankruptcy court in the country. 
In my 2013 article, 22  I employed a unique set of criteria to 
determine that forum shopping23 had become ubiquitous in the US 
in the years since the second Continental bankruptcy case.  From 
1991 to 1996, 55% of publicly held companies with approximately 
 
 15 See LOPUCKI, supra note 6, at 60-68. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See id. at 64.  The incomparable Judge Easterbrook described Judge Balick’s 
actions as “preposterous,” “unfathomable,” and “rogue.”  Id. 
 18 See id. at 60-68. 
 19 See id. at 65. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. at 90. 
 22 See Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 U. CONN. L. 
REV. 159 (2013). 
 23 The terms “forum shopping” and “bankruptcy tourism” are synonymous 
and will be used interchangeably throughout this Article. 
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$500 million or more in assets (“Megacases”)24  forum shopped.25  
From 2007 to 2012, 69% of Megacases did so.26  And the practice 
became more prevalent.  Forty-eight of the eighty-eight Megacases 
filed between 1991 and 1996 had forum shopped, but that number 
spiked to 110 out of 159 from 2007 to 2012.27  Consequently, between 
the two periods, frequency with which Megacases forum shopped 
grew at a statistically significant rate (14%) and the absolute number 
of Megacases that forum shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%).28  
The last thirty years has been a golden age of bankruptcy tourism in 
the United States. 
The U.S. bankruptcy system is regarded as the preeminent 
bankruptcy system in the world due to its ability to secure high 
creditor recovery rates, preserve value for stakeholders, and 
facilitate successful restructurings of financially viable entities.29  It 
is recognized as “the model to which European restructuring laws 
should aspire.”30  In fact, the EU has been extremely clear about its 
aspirations and the reasons for them.  One of the EU’s primary 
policy objectives is to strengthen the economy and the single market 
 
 24 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 173-81; see also UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RSCH. 
DATABASE, supra note 13.  This number was initially measured in 1980 and is 
adjusted depending on the year the case was filed.  For example, a bankruptcy filed 
in 2007 would qualify as a Megacase if the debtor(s) had assets with a fair market 
value of at least $1.2 billion. 
 25 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 177.   
 26 See id. 
 27 See id. 
 28 See id. at 178. 
 29  See generally DOING BUSINESS REPORT, RESOLVING INSOLVENCY 2019, 
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency 
[https://perma.cc/2K4W-P8DU]; Gerard McCormack & Wai Yee Wan, 
Transplanting Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code Into Singapore’s Restructuring and 
Insolvency Laws: Opportunities and Challenges, 19 J. CORP. L. STUD. 69 (2019). 
 30 GERARD MCCORMACK, ANDREW KEAY, SARAH BROWN & JUDITH DAHLGREEN, 
UNIV. OF LEEDS, STUDY ON A NEW APPROACH TO BUSINESS FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY: 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE MEMBER STATES’ RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND 
PRACTICES 219 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 COMMISSION STUDY] (first citing Maria 
Brouwer, Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy Law, 22 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 5 
(2006); then citing Alan Tilley, European Restructuring: Clarifying Trans-Atlantic 
Misconceptions, 8 J. PRIV. EQUITY (SPECIAL TURNAROUND MANAGEMENT ISSUE) 99 
(2005); and then citing Christine Pochet, Institutional Complementarities within 
Corporate Governance Systems: A Comparative Study of Bankruptcy Rules, 6 J. MGMT & 
GOVERNANCE 343 (2002)). 
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by stimulating investment to create jobs. 31   Bolstering capital 
markets and encouraging cross-border investment is a prerequisite 
to this objective. 32   The free flow of capital is one of the EU’s 
fundamental principles.33  But suboptimal restructuring processes 
diminish creditor recoveries and inhibit capital flow.34  Divergent 
restructuring laws preclude successful restructurings and risk 
assessment, which drives up borrowing costs and, in many cases, 
restricts access to credit entirely.35  This is the primary reason the EU 
has focused on modeling an optimal restructuring framework for 
implementation across Member States.36 
Unfortunately, as it currently exists, the framework is 
undermined by two intractable problems:  1) significant divergence 
of substantive restructuring law across Member States that 
undermines predictability and promotes disparate treatment; and 2) 
lack of restructuring experience in the judiciary that suppresses 
efficient and successful restructurings.  Scholars have suggested 
various means to address these problems, but progress has been 
elusive.  Indeed, the EU works through recommendations and 
directives in order to encourage Member States to make substantive 
changes to national law. 37   The EU has repeatedly attempted to 
encourage Member States to modify substantive restructuring law 
to align with policy objectives, but the urgings have been met with 
inaction.38  There is no reason to believe that this intransigence will 
abate any time soon. 
 
 31 See Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 3, COM (2015) 468 final 
(Sept. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Capital Markets Action Plan]. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Preventive Restructuring Frameworks, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the 
Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and Amending 
Directive, at 2-3, COM (2016), 723 final (Nov. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Restructuring 
Directive]. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id.  Due to Brexit uncertainty, I have excluded the UK from Member 
State discussions and assumed that the English courts will not be a viable 
restructuring venue option in upcoming years. 
 37 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J (C 326) 171-72. 
 38 See Horst Eidenmüller, Contracting for a European Insolvency Regime 3 (Eur. 
Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper No. 341/2017, 2017). 
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This Article proposes a novel vantage point from which to view 
the EU’s restructuring framework.  The EU cannot abide a 
protracted timeline for correction.  Instead, the EU should consider 
a radical alternative:  facilitating bankruptcy tourism in order to 
afford corporations increased discretion as to the location of 
restructuring cases.  If implemented, certain Member States will 
aggressively modify substantive and procedural restructuring laws 
in order to attract Megacases.39  In a new regulatory environment 
premised on a forum-shopping model, distressed corporations will 
be able to easily access restructuring laws in a variety of Member 
States.  In some respects, the market of distressed companies will 
help select which Member States have optimal substantive law and 
procedure.  As cases pool in a select group of jurisdictions, judges in 
these courts will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring 
issues and develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive 
issues.  Over time, a more predictable restructuring system emerges, 
improving creditor recoveries, bolstering capital markets, and 
encouraging cross-border lending.  The realization of this virtuous 
cycle may seem unlikely, but this phenomenon has animated the 
U.S. bankruptcy system over the last thirty years. 
Part II of this Article explores the EU’s economic policy 
objectives and the beneficial effect an efficient and effective 
 
 39 Many jurisdictions seek to attract corporate bankruptcy cases in order to 
boost local economies and professional industries.  See Corinne Ball, Sushma 
Jobanputra & Ben Larkin, Singapore Enacts New Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to 
Become Center for International Debt Restructuring, JONES DAY (May/June 2017), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/05/singapore-enacts-new-corpor
ate-bankruptcy-law-in-bid-to-become-center-for-international-debt-restructuring 
[https://perma.cc/HK3U-G359]; see also McCormack & Wan, supra note 29, at 78 
(explaining that Singapore’s recent reforms to its restructuring laws are a blatant 
attempt to encourage international companies to locate their restructuring cases in 
Singapore); NAT’L CONF. OF BANKR. JUDGES, SPECIAL COMM. ON VENUE, REPORT ON 
PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF THE VENUE STATUTE IN COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY CASES 56 
(2018) [hereinafter VENUE REPORT], 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ncbj.org/resource/resmgr/docs_public/Venue_
White_Paper_-_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK3U-G359] (“’Based upon estimates 
from Bloomberg Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home 
jurisdictions over the past thirteen years has drained nearly $4 billion from local 
economies.’” (quoting Venue Fairness: Written Statement on Behalf of National Ad 
Hoc Group of Bankruptcy Practitioners in Support of Venue Fairness, Submitted in 
Support of Testimony of Douglas B. Rosner Before the American Bankruptcy 
Institute Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (Nov. 22, 2013), 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/22nov2013/Venue-St
atement-ABI-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/LMD8-YGXV])). 
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restructuring system can have in furthering those objectives.  This 
part also describes the EU’s current legal and regulatory framework 
and how this framework aggressively polices bankruptcy tourism.  
Part III analyzes the two primary intractable problems embedded in 
the EU’s restructuring framework:  1) significant divergence of 
substantive restructuring law across Member States that 
undermines predictability and promotes disparate treatment; and 2) 
lack of restructuring experience in the judiciary that suppresses 
efficient and successful restructurings.  This part also poses the 
question whether the EU can effectively address these problems in 
the foreseeable future. 
Part IV argues that a radical new approach is necessary in order 
to advance the EU’s economic policy objectives.  In arguing for a 
model premised on the type of controlled tourism prevalent in the 
United States, this part describes forum shopping in the United 
States and posits that by facilitating tourism, the EU may be able to 
address the intractable problems embedded in its restructuring 
framework. 
In Part V, I explain how tourism can help create judicial hubs, 
and this prospect is particularly appealing in the EU.  Over time, 
tourism supports the development of optimal restructuring laws 
and experienced judges located in distinct locales.  Countries 
wishing to host these hubs may be more inclined to adopt EU 
restructuring policy suggestions.  If successful, judges in these hubs 
will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring issues and 
develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive issues.  
Predictability allows companies and creditors to formulate a range 
of in-court restructuring outcomes with a high degree of certainty.  
This data also informs and facilitates out-of-court restructuring 
negotiations and improves outcomes.  Experienced judges 
accelerate case speed, which increases the likelihood of a successful 
restructuring while also lowering process costs.  As creditor 
recoveries improve, capital markets grow, ultimately reducing 
borrowing costs and enhancing cross-border lending. 
In Part VI, I delineate my proposed amendments to EU 
restructuring law.  My primary proposal focuses on a new 
conceptualization of a company’s center of main interests (“COMI”) 
that better aligns EU venue provisions with U.S. law but with 
meaningful distinctions to avoid abuse.  I acknowledge that easing 
venue regulations increases the risk of abusive or fraudulent 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
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tourism.  Consequently, I further propose procedural changes that 
empower courts to better investigate malfeasance that may be the 
true motivation for tourism. 
There is extensive literature exploring the EU’s restructuring 
framework and how to improve it.  This Article offers a view of the 
cathedral in another light.40  Controlled bankruptcy tourism may be 
a necessary lever for addressing intractable framework deficiencies.  
By fostering the creation of judicial hubs with optimal restructuring 
laws and experienced jurists, tourism would allow the EU to 
promptly address legal and structural deficiencies.  But in order to 
enjoy these benefits, the EU must first revise its restructuring laws 
to facilitate tourism.  This Article includes multifaceted proposals 
designed to encourage the beneficial aspects of bankruptcy tourism 
but, at the same time, avoid negative externalities that could 
destabilize the restructuring system. 
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 
FRAMEWORK 
The European Union represents a political and economic 
confederation of twenty-seven countries, commonly known as 
Member States.41  To those outside of Europe, the EU may appear to 
be a type of federal government exerting supremacy, but that is 
inaccurate.  The EU is pursuing economic objectives that will ideally 
create an efficient single market and facilitate the production and 
 
 40  In the late 19th century, Claude Monet produced a series of paintings 
capturing the front façade of the Rouen Cathedral in Normandy.  Each painting 
detailed the façade from the same angle but at a different time of day.  The variances 
in light have a profound impact on the Cathedral’s visage.  Monet made over thirty 
paintings, and it has been said that one must see all of them to truly understand the 
Cathedral.  See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90 n.2 
(1972) (citing G. HAMILTON, CLAUDE MONET’S PAINTINGS OF ROUEN CATHEDRAL 4-5, 
19-20, 27 (1960)). 
 41  The 27 Member Countries of the EU, EUROPEAN UNION (Oct. 30, 2020), 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en 
[https://perma.cc/N3Ny-YNCE]. 
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sale of goods and services within that market.42  For example, the 
different political and legal institutions that make up the EU (“EU 
Institutions”) are not authorized to manage most of the fundamental 
matters overseen by the U.S. federal government, including a 
military, taxation, social welfare provisions, education, civilian 
infrastructure, and human rights.43  EU Institutions do not enjoy the 
U.S. federal government’s power to extract revenue through a 
comprehensive tax structure.44   Rather, EU Institutions employ a 
variety of direct and indirect mechanisms to facilitate the free 
movement of goods, services, capital, workers, and people within a 
single market.45 
Capital markets integration is a preeminent issue for the EU.46  
Capital markets are more efficient—resulting in lower borrowing 
costs—when creditor recoveries in corporate distress situations are 
predictable. 47   And predictability is based in large part on the 
substance and implementation of restructuring laws.  However, 
unlike the U.S. federal government, EU Institutions cannot 
unilaterally mandate changes to substantive restructuring laws.48  
There is no one bankruptcy code for bankruptcy proceedings in the 
EU.  Member States control the substantive law within their own 
country, and the divergence across the region is significant.49  EU 
Institutions are resigned to formulating an optimal corporate 
restructuring framework and then attempting to incentivize 
 
 42 See Andrew Moravcsik, Federalism in the European Union: Rhetoric and Reality, 
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 173 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse ed. 
2003). 
 43 See id. at 166-69 (noting that the task of collective security was arguably 
placed in the hands of NATO). 
 44 See How the EU is Funded, EUROPEAN UNION, https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/eu-budget/revenue-income_en [https://;erma.cc/KQ7U-V75B].  
The EU’s primary sources of income include agricultural levies, a portion of 
national value-added taxation from Member States, and fines imposed when 
businesses fail to comply with EU rules.  Id. 
 45 See generally Gabriel Moss, Ian Fletcher & Stuart Isaacs, The EU Regulation 
on Insolvency Proceedings (3d ed. 2016).   
 46 See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31. 
 47 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2. 
 48 See generally MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45. 
 49 See Part III.A., infra. 
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Member States to align substantive national laws with EU policy 
objectives. 
a. The European Union’s Economic Policy Objectives and the Virtuous 
Cycle 
The EU’s economic policy objectives are varied but one 
overriding priority is to strengthen the economy and the single 
market by stimulating investment to create jobs.50  Bolstering capital 
markets and encouraging cross-border investment is a prerequisite 
to this objective.51  Indeed, the free flow of capital is one of the EU’s 
fundamental principles. 52   The EU’s ability to implement this 
principle has been mixed.  The European economy is as large as the 
U.S. economy, “but Europe’s equity markets are less than half the 
size, [and] its debt markets less than a third.”53  Borrowing costs, 
access to credit, and capital liquidity—including cross-border 
investment—are directly affected by default risk and creditor 
recoveries in distressed scenarios. 54   Suboptimal restructuring 
processes diminish creditor recoveries and inhibit capital flow. 55  
 
 50 See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31, at 3. 
 51 The ultimate goal has been described as the “Capital Markets Union”—one 
true single market for capital across the EU.  See id. at 4-6. 
 52 See Capital Markets Action Plan, supra note 31, at 3 
 53 See id. (stating that the gap between individual Member States is greater 
than the gap between Europe and the US). 
 54  See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2 (“Importantly, insolvency 
matters are also a deterrent for cross-border expansion and investments.  Many 
investors mention uncertainty over insolvency rules or the risk of lengthy or 
complex insolvency procedures in another country as a main reason for not 
investing or not entering into a business relationship outside their own country.  A 
higher degree of harmoni[z]ation in insolvency law is thus essential for a well-
functioning single market and for a true Capital Markets Union.”).  
 55 See id. at 3 (“The quality of Member States’ restructuring and insolvency 
frameworks directly affects creditors’ recovery rates.  World Bank indicators 
suggest that in the EU recovery rates vary between 30% in Croatia and Romania, 
and 90% in Belgium and Finland.  Recovery rates are higher in economies where 
restructuring is the most common insolvency proceeding.  On average, in such 
economies creditors can expect to recover 83% of their claims, against an average of 
57% in liquidation procedures.  While these outcomes also reflect economic factors 
such as the overall health of the economy, they underline the importance of a 
comprehensive insolvency framework, anchored in a strong institutional and 
cultural setting, in delivering better outcomes for society.”) (citations omitted). 
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Divergent restructuring laws suppress successful restructurings and 
preclude risk assessment, which drives up borrowing costs and can 
restrict access to credit entirely.56  This is the primary reason that EU 
Institutions have focused on implementing a comprehensive 
restructuring framework across Member States.57   
Myriad economic benefits are available to the extent that EU 
restructuring laws become more coherent and can be implemented 
uniformly.  I describe this phenomenon as the virtuous cycle.  
Primarily, efficient and effective in-court processes facilitate 
successful restructurings of financially viable companies.  A system 
that makes restructurings a meaningful option is optimal because 
restructurings limit unnecessary liquidations, which destroy 
enterprise value, suppress creditor recoveries, and cause employee 
displacement.58   Further, these system facets would improve the 
likelihood of out-of-court settlements with creditors.  Out-of-court 
restructurings are far less disruptive to a business than court-
supervised proceedings and recovery rates for creditors are 
invariably greater.59  Process costs are reduced and process speed is 
accelerated.60   Overall, successful out-of-court restructurings help 
 
 56 See id. at 2. 
 57 See id. 
 58 The law in many Member States steers—perhaps unintentionally—viable 
businesses towards liquidation.  Approximately 200,000 EU companies go 
bankrupt each year, resulting in 1.7 million job losses every year.  One in four of 
these liquidations are cross-border insolvencies.  Theoretically, “[a] significant 
percentage of firms and related jobs could be saved” through preventive 
procedures and restructurings.  Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2.  Further, 
“[d]ata shows that the highest recovery rates for creditors are in economies where 
restructuring is the most common insolvency proceeding and that 45% of OECD 
economies use restructuring as the most common way to save viable firms. They 
also have an average recovery rate of 83 cents on the dollar, versus 57 cents on the 
dollar in countries where liquidation is the prevalent outcome.”  Id. at 13.  
Unfortunately, from 1999 to 2012, restructurings—as opposed to liquidation or 
going-concern sales—occurred in Germany in only two percent of all business 
insolvencies.  See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 15.  The restructuring tally is only 
slightly better in the UK (approximately 10% in 2016), Spain (approximately 10% in 
2015), and Italy (approximately 5% in 2014).  See id. 
 59 See STEFANIA BARIATTI, ROBERT VAN  GALEN, INSOL EUR., STUDY ON A NEW 
APPROACH TO BUSINESS FAILURE AND INSOLVENCY 20 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 INSOL 
STUDY], https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3299431a-
86ac-11e5-b8b7-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-152035587 
[https://perma.cc/GRG6-FHZ8]. 
 60 See id. at 9. 
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reduce borrowing costs. 61   However, out-of-court settlement 
discussions occur in the shadow of in-court proceedings.  Indeed, 
out-of-court restructurings are difficult to undertake when the 
potential recoveries through a court proceeding are highly 
unpredictable.62  A more predictable restructuring system allows 
creditors a proper frame of reference in developing their settlement 
options. 
In the aggregate, a system that deemphasizes liquidations and 
encourages out-of-court settlements and in-court reorganizations of 
financially viable companies enhances creditor recoveries, which 
reduce borrowing costs.63  Further, the risk profile of cross-border 
lending becomes more manageable, facilitating that type of lending 
and improving access to credit.64 
The virtuous cycle is realized through these dynamics.  
Entrepreneurial activity increases, restructurings are destigmatized, 
and businesses have the ability to withstand cyclical market 
downturns.65  The overall benefits to capital markets and borrowers 
are profound. 
Unfortunately, as detailed in the next section, the virtuous cycle 
is elusive.  The EU has been unable to spur the implementation of 
an efficient and effective restructuring system overarching its 
Member States. 
 
 
 61 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2. 
 62 In other words, systemic obstacles exist to out-of-court settlement when 
parties lack meaningful information regarding their alternatives to settlement.  I 
agree with scholars who have argued that the highly unpredictable nature of the 
valuation fight embedded in a Chapter 11 plan confirmation process represents an 
incentive for consensual stakeholder bargaining.  However, that is merely one 
unpredictable variable that exists among other relatively predictable variables in 
the US restructuring system.  As detailed in Part III.a., infra, I assert that too many 
facets of the EU restructuring framework lack meaningful predictability, which 
undermines out-of-court settlement. 
 63 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2-3. 
 64  See id. at 2. 
 65 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 3, 6. 
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b. The Regulatory Framework 
i. The European Insolvency Regulation 
A “regulation” is one of the primary ways that EU Institutions 
advance policy objectives.  Regulations provide provisions that have 
a general application to all Member States, though there may be 
differing practical effects for the various individual parties or 
entities to which they apply.66  Regulations are also binding in their 
entirety and will apply in identical terms throughout the EU. 67  
Regulations are an instrument of a single EU legal order and are 
expected to receive a uniform interpretation. 68   Finally, Member 
States may not enact national law that has the effect of modifying a 
regulation. 69 
In order to provide a procedural framework and choice-of-law 
rules for cross-border bankruptcy cases, 70  a regulation for 
insolvency proceedings was entered into force on May 31, 2002 
(“EIR”).71  The EIR contained “rules on jurisdiction for insolvency 
proceedings, the recognition of decisions with respect to such 
proceedings, and the coordination of multiple proceedings 
involving a single debtor.”72 
The EIR addressed bankruptcy tourism in its preamble, noting 
that “[i]t is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market to avoid incentives for the parties to transfer assets or judicial 
proceedings from one Member State to another, seeking to obtain a 
 
 66  See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45; see also Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 171-72 (“A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding 
in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”).  For example, the 
European Council will adopt a regulation when it seeks to impose common 
safeguards on goods imported from outside the EU. 
 67  See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 25. 
 68  See id. 
 69  See id. at 26. 
 70 See Horst Eidenmüller, Abuse of Law in the Context of European Insolvency Law, 
6 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2009). 
 71 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) (EC) [hereinafter EIR]. 
 72 Id. 
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more favorable legal position (forum shopping).” 73   The EIR 
effectuated this in Article 3 by enabling a main insolvency 
proceeding to be opened only in the Member State where the debtor 
had its COMI.74  The EIR described COMI as “the place where the 
debtor conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis 
and is therefore ascertainable by third parties.”75  Article 3 further 
provides that the place of the debtor’s registered office is presumed 
to be the COMI in the absence of proof to the contrary.76 
By design, the EIR had a limited scope.  The regulation did not 
attempt to address any substantive restructuring law or the ultimate 
resolution of restructuring cases.  Consequently, the regulation did 
little to address deficiencies in the EU restructuring framework that 
were apparent by the following decade. 
ii. Guidance from the European Commission 
On December 12, 2012, the European Commission adopted a 
report on the application of the European Insolvency Regulation 
(the “2012 Report on the EIR”).77  The report noted that the EIR was 
“generally regarded as a successful instrument for the coordination 
of cross-border insolvency proceedings” but guidance as to 
substantive restructuring law was absent. 78   As to bankruptcy 
tourism, the report touted the use of a debtor’s COMI in determining 
jurisdiction for restructuring cases. 79   The report acknowledged 
that—despite the otherwise rigorous standards established by the 
COMI-test and further clarified by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”)—corporations frequently forum 
 
 73 Id. pmbl. 4. 
 74 Id. art. 3. 
 75 Id. pmbl. 13. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC)  
No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, COM (2012) 743 final (Dec. 
12, 2012), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0743 [https://perma.cc/CQ4Z-
KAXK]. 
 78 Id. § 1.2. 
 79 Id. § 3.1 
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shopped in order to benefit from what they perceived as more 
effective restructuring processes.80  However, the 2012 Report on the 
EIR took a neutral view on this behavior.  Indeed, the report 
explained that 
[bankruptcy tourism] cannot per se be regarded as abusive 
or illegitimate. First, COMI moves of companies have been 
accepted by the CJEU as a legitimate exercise of the freedom 
of establishment . . . . Moreover, COMI relocation often 
benefits creditors rather than disadvantaging them.  Often, 
relocations are even driven by the (senior) creditors in an 
attempt to rescue or restructure the company. There are 
several cases where COMI relocation to the UK allowed the 
successful restructuring of a company because of the 
flexibility which English insolvency law grants companies in 
this respect.81 
Business failures in the EU received a considerable amount of 
attention in the years following the Great Recession.  In 2012, the 
European Commission designated the modernization of EU 
insolvency law as a key action in order to improve business survival 
rates and creditor recoveries. 82   In 2014, INSOL Europe—the 
European association of insolvency professionals—issued a 
comparative analysis of business failure and insolvency in Member 
States as of October 2013.83  The 2014 INSOL Study highlighted the 
significant variance in national restructuring laws across the EU and 
how this fact creates a level of unpredictability that undermined 
corporate restructuring, capital markets, and cross-border 
investments.84 
 
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the 
Single Market Act II, § 2.2, COM (2012) 573 final (Oct. 3, 2012), https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0573 
[https://perma.cc/6ND6-FECH]. 
 83 See 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 5-6. 
 84 See id. at 6-10. 
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Building on the 2014 INSOL Study, the European Commission 
issued a recommendation on March 3, 2014.85  The recommendation 
acknowledged that the EU’s key objectives related to corporate 
restructuring—lowering borrowing costs, improving capital 
markets efficiency, and facilitating successful in-court and out-of-
court restructurings—would remain elusive without greater 
uniformity across Member States’ substantive restructuring laws.86  
Therefore, the recommendation included numerous proposals 
regarding restructuring law and encouraged Member States to 
incorporate the recommendations into their respective national 
laws. 87   Unfortunately, the recommendation failed to spur 
meaningful action among Member States.88 
iii. Guidance from the Court of Justice and Real Seat Theory 
During this time, the CJEU provided guidance on the 
interpretation of the regulatory framework noted above.  More 
specifically, the court’s rulings in Eurofood and Interedil added 
texture to the definition of COMI89 and embraced the “real seat” 
theory. 
Eurofood90 involved a dispute regarding the appropriate location 
for the main insolvency proceedings of Eurofood IFSC Ltd. 
(“Eurofood”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Parmalat SpA 
registered in Ireland.  In December 2003, Parmalat SpA had been 
admitted to an insolvency proceeding in Italy. 91   The following 
month, one of Eurofood’s creditors asserted that Eurofood was 
insolvent and sought to institute liquidation proceedings against the 
 
 85 Commission Recommendation 2014/135, 2014 O.J. (L 74) 65 [hereinafter 
2014 Commission Recommendation]. 
 86 See id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 87 See id. ¶ 1. 
 88 Cf. Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 4 (noting that businesses continue to forum 
shop). 
 89 The EIR does not define COMI, but Recital 13 in the EIR preamble provides 
that “the ‘center of main interests’ should correspond to the place where the debtor 
conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and [which] is 
therefore ascertainable by third parties.”  EIR, supra note 71. 
 90 Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854. 
 91 Id. para. 18. 
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company in Ireland.92  The High Court appointed a liquidator.93  In 
February 2004, Eurofood was admitted as part of Parmalat’s 
insolvency proceeding, and the liquidator in the Parmalat case was 
appointed to oversee Eurofood. 94   A jurisdictional war erupted 
between the Italian and Irish courts with various questions being 
directed to the CJEU.95 
The CJEU was asked to determine, inter alia, the critical factors 
for identifying a subsidiary’s COMI where the subsidiary and its 
parent have registered offices in two different Member States.96  The 
court first explained that COMI is a concept unique to the EIR and 
must be interpreted in a uniform way, uninfluenced by Member 
State national law.97  In exploring the contours of COMI, the court 
noted that the phrase contemplates consideration of criteria that “are 
both objective and ascertainable by third parties.  That objectivity 
and that possibility of ascertainment by third parties are necessary 
in order to ensure legal certainty and foreseeability” regarding the 
location of a main insolvency proceeding.98  
The court acknowledged that the EIR’s Article 3(1) created a 
presumption that the place of the debtor’s registered office is the 
center of its main interests.99  That presumption “can be rebutted 
only if factors [that] are both objective and ascertainable by third 
parties enable it to be established that an actual situation exists” that 
does not align with the impression conveyed by the location of the 
registered office.100  To clarify this proposition, the court offered a 
specific example where the presumption would be rebutted.101  In 
many cases, a debtor carries out the bulk of its business operations 
in one Member State while carrying out virtually none of its business 
 
 92 Id. para. 19. 
 93 Id. para. 20. 
 94 Id. para. 21. 
 95 See id. paras. 22-25. 
 96 Id. para. 26. 
 97 Id. para. 31. 
 98 Id. para. 33. 
 99 Id. para. 6. 
 100 Id. para 34. 
 101 Id. paras. 35-36. 
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operations in the Member State in which it has its registered office.102  
In this case, there is a strong incongruence in the signals sent to 
creditors.103  Consequently, the court explained, third parties will 
invariably be able to establish that objective and ascertainable 
factors rebut the Article 3(1) presumption.104 
As to venue decisions, Eurofood serves to dilute the certainty 
offered by reliance on the location of a debtor’s registered office.  The 
qualitative assessment advocated by the court subjects debtors to 
additional scrutiny and limits tourism options. 
The CJEU further explored the contours of COMI in Interedil.105  
In that case, Interedil transferred its registered office from Italy to 
the United Kingdom in 2001.106  As a consequence, the company was 
removed from the register of companies in Italy.107 Subsequently, 
Interedil was acquired by another company, and the title to 
properties that Interedil owned in Italy was transferred to 
Windomist Ltd.108  Interedil was removed from the UK register of 
companies in July 2002.109  In October 2003, a creditor of Interedil 
filed a petition to open bankruptcy proceedings against Interedil in 
Italy.110  Interedil challenged the jurisdiction of the Italian court.111 
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation ruled that the Article 
3(1) presumption had been rebutted due to various circumstances, 
including (i) Interedil’s ownership of immovable property in Italy; 
(ii) a lease agreement involving Interedil and two hotel complexes; 
(iii) a contract involving Interedil and a banking institution; and (iv) 
“the Bari register of companies had not been notified of the transfer 
 
 102 This is the typical scenario in the United States where a super-majority of 
Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware but virtually none have any 
meaningful business operations in the state.  See Delaware Division of 
Corporations, supra note 14. 
 103 Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. I-3854, para. 27. 
 104 Id. para. 37. 
 105 Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R. 
I-9939. 
 106 Id. para. 10. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. para. 11. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. para. 12. 
 111 Id. para. 13. 
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of Interedil’s registered office.”112  The proceedings were stayed in 
order to direct the jurisdictional questions, inter alia, to the CJEU.113 
The CJEU addressed the questions posed by the dispute by first 
agreeing with the Advocate General’s point that the EIR’s Recital 13 
made clear Parliament’s intention to attach greater importance to the 
place in which a company has its central administration—as 
opposed to its registered office—as the criterion for determining 
venue.114  The court then reaffirmed its Eurofood ruling, explaining 
that a debtor’s COMI “must be identified by reference to criteria that 
are both objective and ascertainable by third parties, in order to 
ensure legal certainty and foreseeability concerning the 
determination” of jurisdiction.115  The court noted that the Article 
3(1) presumption is well-founded to the extent that “the bodies 
responsible for the management and supervision of a company are 
in the same place as its registered office and the management 
decisions of the company are taken [in that locale and] in a manner 
ascertainable by third parties.” 116   But the presumption may be 
rebutted if central administration is not located in the same venue as 
the registered office.117 
The court emphasized that Article 3(1) is subject to a qualitative 
assessment, 118  which implicitly endorsed real seat theory as 
opposed to incorporation theory. 119   Therefore, in restructuring 
 
 112 Id. para. 16. 
 113 Id. para. 17. 
 114  See id. paras. 48, 69 (acknowledging AG Kokott’s opinion delivered on 
March 10, 2011). 
 115 Id. para. 49. 
 116 Id. para. 50. 
 117 Id. para. 51. 
 118 Id. 
 119 As explained by the European Union’s Study on the Law Applicable to 
Companies, under the incorporation theory 
the rules applicable to companies are determined by the law at the place 
of incorporation, irrespective of the commercial links between the foreign 
company and the host state.  Thus, following this approach, a foreign 
company will be recognized and retain its legal capacity and internal 
organization, even where its headquarters or significant parts (or indeed 
all) of its operations are located or moved to a host state following this 
approach.   
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cases, the jurisdictional inquiry must take into account “all the 
places in which the debtor company pursues economic activities and 
all those in which it holds assets, in so far as those places are 
ascertainable by third parties.” 120   The court’s interpretation 
confirms that a significant level of complexity is embedded in the 
venue question.  The court notes that the factors the Italian court 
considered in finding that Italy was the appropriate venue—
including the location of immovable property, lease agreement, and 
financial contracts—are all meaningful criteria but  
cannot be regarded as sufficient factors to rebut the 
presumption unless a comprehensive assessment of all the 
relevant factors makes it possible to establish, in a manner 
that is ascertainable by third parties, that the company’s 
actual center of management and supervision and of the 
management of its interests is located in that other Member 
State.121 
The ruling serves to reaffirm Eurofood’s qualitative assessment 
methodology; the effect of which is to subject venue decisions to 
comprehensive, fact-intensive scrutiny. 
iv. The Recast EIR 
In 2015, the European Commission revisited the EIR in order to 
“enhance the effective administration of cross-border insolvency 
proceedings.”122  As a result, the European Insolvency Regulation 
 
The real seat doctrine, on the other hand, attempts to determine the 
jurisdiction the company is in fact most closely connected with.  While 
there is no single way of determining what constitutes the ‘closest 
connection’, the central administration or headquarters of a company are 
often used by Member States following this approach. 
CARSTEN GERNER-BEUERLE, FEDERICO M. MUCCIARELLI, EDMUND-PHILLIP SCHUSTER, 
MATHIAS M. SIEMS, STUDY ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO COMPANIES 25 (2017), 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/259a1dae-1a8c-11e7-
808e-01aa75ed71a1 [https://perma.cc/J6KG-3SD6].  
 120 Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R. 
I-9939, para. 52. 
 121 Id. para. 53. 
 122  See Council Regulation 2015/848, 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19, at Recital (1) 
[hereinafter Recast EIR]. 
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was recast and took effect on June 26, 2017 (the “Recast EIR”).123  The 
Recast EIR sought to, inter alia,  
(i) [address] pre-insolvency or hybrid proceedings, (ii) 
clarify[] the concept of Center of Main Interests (COMI) [in 
order to reduce bankruptcy tourism incentives], (iii) 
strengthen[] the role of the main proceedings when several 
proceedings are opened against the same debtor in different 
Member States, (iv) introduce[] new rules on the publication 
of the proceedings and lodging of claims, (v) and include[] a 
new chapter for the insolvency of a group of companies.124 
The Recast EIR adopts many of the general structural 
adjustments advocated by the Report on the EIR.125  However, the 
Recast EIR implements a more aggressive regulatory approach to 
bankruptcy tourism.126   Primarily, Recital (5) argues that internal 
markets will not function properly if regulatory incentives127 exist 
for parties to engage in bankruptcy tourism—defined as an attempt 
by a party to “transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one 
Member State to another seeking to obtain a more favorable legal 
position to the detriment of the general body of creditors.”128  The 
Recast EIR is more explicit in Recital (29), which provides that 
fraudulent or abusive forum shopping should be prevented.129  The 
EIR’s description of COMI is virtually unchanged,130 but Recitals 
(28) and (30) establish a creditor-centric perspective for COMI 
 
 123 Francisco Garcimartin, The EU Insolvency Regulation Recast: Scope and Rules 
on Jurisdiction, 1 n.1 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2752412 
[https://perma.cc/3U5Z-FTY2]. 
 124 Id. at 2. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 13. 
 127 This statement implies that EU regulations should not create incentives to 
forum shop.  Naturally, this implication overlooks the fact that the incentives for 
forum shopping are created by the bankruptcy market.  EU regulations are better 
positioned to impose legal restrictions to prevent the practice as opposed to 
attempting to create disincentives. 
 128 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, at Recital (5). 
 129 Id. at Recital (29). 
 130  COMI is described as “the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests on a regular basis and which is ascertainable by third 
parties.”  Id. art. 3(1). 
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assessment. 131   Primarily, courts are instructed that “[w]hen 
determining whether the center of the debtor’s main interests is 
ascertainable by third parties, special consideration should be given to 
the creditors and to their perception as to where a debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests.”132 Further, the presumption that the 
location of a debtor’s registered office establishes COMI is portrayed 
as a weak one.  Indeed, notwithstanding the presumption, courts are 
instructed to  
carefully assess whether the cent[er] of the debtor’s main 
interests is genuinely located in that Member State.  In the 
case of a company, it should be possible to rebut this 
presumption where the company’s central administration is 
located in a Member State other than that of its registered 
office, and where a comprehensive assessment of all the 
relevant factors establishes, in a manner that is ascertainable 
by third parties, that the company’s actual center of 
management and supervision and of the management of its 
interests is located in that other Member State.133 
In order to prevent abusive forum shopping, the presumption 
does not apply at all if the debtor has “relocated its registered office 
or principal place of business to another Member State within the 3-
month period prior to the” case opening.134  Further, the Recast EIR 
instructs judges to assess on their “own motion” whether a debtor’s 
center of main interests is actually located within the court’s 
jurisdiction.135  And any judgment opening insolvency proceedings 
must specify its jurisdictional basis.136 
Article 3 also allows creditors to institute involuntary 
bankruptcy proceedings, which offers creditors a way to combat 
 
 131 Id. at Recitals (28), (30). 
 132 Id. at Recital (28) (emphasis added). 
 133 Id. at Recital (30).  This provision captures the CJEU’s reasoning in Interedil.  
See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 446. 
 134 Recast EIR, supra note 122, at Recital (31). 
 135  Id. at Recital (27), and art. (4).  United States venue provisions do not 
instruct judges overseeing corporate bankruptcy cases to undertake this inquiry sua 
sponte—and most do not—though some scholars have recommended the change.  
See Parikh, supra note 22, at 201. 
 136 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 4(1). 
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debtor tourism. 137   Article 5 offers any creditor the ability to 
challenge the court’s jurisdictional decision and seek judicial review 
of such decision.138   Finally, the Recast EIR continues secondary 
proceedings that may involve courts in numerous other Member 
States and be overseen by insolvency practitioners.139  In such a case, 
Article 66 provides that in the event at least two-thirds of 
restructuring practitioners agree that one particular court is the most 
appropriate court for the opening of group coordination 
proceedings, then that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction.140 
Ultimately, the desire to aggressively regulate bankruptcy 
tourism is clear when viewing the recast provisions of Article 3 
“with entirely new provisions enacted as Articles 4 and 5 . . . all of 
which must be read in the light of . . . Recitals (22) to (38).”141 
v. A New Study of Business Failure 
Despite the Recast EIR’s new procedural guidance, substantive 
restructuring law at the Member State-level remained incongruent.  
This inaction prompted a more aggressive response.  In 2015, the 
European Commission acknowledged that the EU’s fragmented 
restructuring laws were inhibiting corporate growth and capital 
market efficiency142 and commissioned a new comparative study on 
substantive restructuring law throughout the EU.  The study 
 
 137 Id. art. 3(4)(b)(i). 
 138 Id. art. 5(1). 
 139  Id. at art. 3.  The insolvency practitioners overseeing secondary 
proceedings are akin to  Chapter 11 trustees in U.S. bankruptcy courts. 
 140 Id. art. 66(1). 
 141 See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45, at 64. 
 142  See JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, COMPLETING EUROPE’S ECONOMIC AND 
MONETARY UNION 7 (2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/5-presidents-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q26-BHAA]; see 
also 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 25 (noting that “(i) there is a need for 
greater convergence in insolvency law and restructuring proceedings across 
Member State, (ii) the inefficiency and divergence of insolvency laws make it harder 
to assess and manage credit risk, and that (iii) enhancing legal certainty and 
encouraging the timely restructuring of borrowers in financial distress is 
particularly relevant for the success of strategies to address the problem of non-
performing loans in some Member States.” (citing “Towards the Completion of the 
Banking Union,” COM (2015) 587 final (Nov. 24, 2015))).  
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analyzing business failure in the EU was published in January 2016 
(the “2016 Commission Study”).143 
The 2016 Commission Study documented a comparative study 
on substantive restructuring laws throughout the EU. More 
specifically, the study delineated the manner in which Member 
States address a number of fundamental restructuring issues, 
including director liability, creditor priorities, avoidance, initiation 
of proceedings, reorganization plans, creditor voting, out-of-court 
restructuring options, and general procedures.144   Ultimately, the 
study highlighted the lack of uniformity for restructuring laws 
across the EU.145  The depth of this variance and the ultimate harm 
the discrepancy could cause the EU’s economic policy objectives 
prompted action. 
vi. The Restructuring Directive 
A “directive” is a legislative act that sets out broad goals that all 
Member States must achieve. 146   However, a directive affords 
Member States flexibility.147   Individual countries construct their 
own means to fulfill these goals and draft national laws to 
implement this design. 148   On November 22, 2016, the EU 
Commission published its proposal for a new restructuring directive 
(the “Restructuring Directive”).149  In July 2019, the EU Parliament 
 
 143 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30. 
 144 Id. at i-vi. 
 145 See id. at 2-8. 
 146 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 172. 
 147 See Id. 
 148 See Id. (“A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon 
each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.”).  For example, on April 17, 2019, the 
European Council adopted a Copyright Directive that had 4 broad goals: (i) 
protecting press publications; (ii) reducing the value gap between the profits made 
by internet platforms and by content creators; (iii) encouraging collaboration 
between these two groups; and (iv) creating copyright exceptions for text- and data-
mining.  See Directive 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and 
Amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92. 
 149 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34. 
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adopted the Restructuring Directive.150  Member States have two 
years from the adoption date to pass national law tailored to fulfill 
these goals.151  
The Restructuring Directive seeks to remove various obstacles 
inhibiting a well-functioning single market.152  The discrepancy in 
substantive restructuring law across Member States is the 
fountainhead for most of these obstacles.  The Restructuring 
Directive acknowledges the limitations of the Recast EIR—namely, 
that the regulation standardizes a few procedural matters at the 
periphery of restructuring conflicts but fails to tackle significant 
discrepancies in substantive law that eclipse procedural 
alignment. 153   The directive provides structural guidance as to 
various administrative and non-core matters, including out-of-court 
restructurings, 154  review of bankruptcy professionals and their 
services, 155  bankruptcy jurist training, 156  and data collection. 157  
More importantly, the directive also seeks to establish minimum 
standards as to the hydraulics of restructuring laws, including the 
automatic stay, debtor financing, restructuring plans, valuation 
methodologies, case appeals, and discharge.158  Unfortunately, the 
establishment of minimum standards represents only incremental 
improvement.  
Collectively, the EU’s regulatory framework and CJEU case law 
create the EU’s design for corporate restructuring (“EU 
Restructuring Law”).  As noted above, the design seeks to fulfill 
lofty economic policy objectives.  However, as explored in the 
 
 150   Patrick J. Potter, Dania Slim, & Jihyun Park, The European Union 
Restructuring Directive, pillsbury (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/european-union-restruct
uring-directive.html [https://perma.cc/MP5M-5AF5].  
 151 Alexandra Schluck-Amend, EU Parliament Adopts Directive on Preventive 
Restructuring Frameworks, LEXOLOGY, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4e2895c0-7f81-41b9-8033-4dbf
769a3089 [https://perma.cc/T9YQ-YREA].  Note that the implementation period 
can be extended by one year on request, but such requests are rarely granted. 
 152 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 14. 
 153 See id. at 9-10. 
 154 Id. at 25. 
 155 Id. at 35. 
 156 Id. art. 24(1). 
 157 Id. art. 29. 
 158 See id. at 21-22. 
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following section, intractable problems embedded in the EU 
restructuring framework preclude progress toward these objectives. 
III. INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS EMBEDDED IN THE EU’S 
RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK 
The previous section explored the European Union’s economic 
policy objectives and how its corporate restructuring framework is 
being modified to advance these objectives.  Despite these changes, 
the framework is plagued by two intractable problems:  1) 
significant divergence of substantive restructuring law across 
Member States that undermines predictability and promotes 
disparate treatment; and 2) lack of restructuring experience in the 
judiciary that suppresses efficient and successful restructurings. 
a. The Harmonization Quandary 
The EU recognizes that uniform restructuring laws can bolster 
capital markets and improve the probability of meaningful creditor 
recoveries and successful corporate restructurings, both within and 
without judicial proceedings. 159   Harmonization of restructuring 
laws is essential for a well-functioning EU single-market. 160  
Unfortunately, the divergence of substantive restructuring law 
across Member States is significant.  Debtors face disparate 
treatment on fundamental issues, including (i) the ability to file for 
 
 159 See id. at 2-3.  
 160  See id. at 2; see also 2014 INSOL STUDY supra note 59, at 176-82; 2016 
COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 25 (“[T]here is a need for greater convergence 
in insolvency law and restructuring proceedings across Member State[s and] the 
inefficiency and divergence of insolvency laws make it harder to assess and manage 
credit risk . . . .”); GIORGIO CHERUBINI, ET AL., INSOL EUR. HARMONISATION OF 
INSOLVENCY LAW AT EU LEVEL 7 (2010), 
https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/ipol-juri_nt2010419633_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7PW-R5ER] (“[D]isparities between national insolvency and 
restructuring laws create obstacles, competitive advantages and/or disadvantages 
or difficulties for companies with cross-border activities or ownership within the 
EU.”). 
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bankruptcy in advance of an actual insolvency;161 (ii) management 
of the debtor post-filing and appointment of an insolvency 
practitioner; 162  (iii) the automatic stay; 163  (iv) ranking creditor 
unsecured and secured claims; 164  (v) post-petition super-priority 
financing; 165  (vi) avoidance actions, including preference 166  and 
 
 161 Many countries require that the debtor be insolvent—or at least in the zone 
of insolvency—and able to establish that fact (e.g. Croatia, Finland, Greece, 
Hungary, and Italy).  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 251-54. 
 162 In many countries, debtor-in-possession management is “seldom used”; 
rather, an insolvency practitioner is appointed immediately upon filing of a case 
and oversees management (e.g., Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Sweden) or 
assumes some or all management authority (e.g., Malta, Ireland, and Poland).  See 
2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58; 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, 
at 26, 30-32.  However, in other countries, insolvency practitioners are not 
appointed automatically (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, and Slovenia), but the 
debtor is often subject to aggressive supervision.  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra 
note 30, at 256-58.  Some commentators have argued that a supervisor or 
bankruptcy trustee should be appointed in all cases in order to play an oversight 
role and safeguard creditor interests.  See, e.g., Horst Eidenmüller & Kristin van 
Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: the European Commission’s 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, 16 EUR. BUS. 
ORG. L. REV. 625, 660-61 (2015).  Naturally, such an approach would contravene a 
long-standing practice in US bankruptcy cases.  I argue that creditor interests can 
more effectively be protected by other means (e.g., a creditors’ committee or 
appointment of a trustee upon motion) that are far less disruptive to management 
during a period where disruption can preclude a successful reorganization.  
Further, this type of mandatory rule may undermine management autonomy and 
ultimately encourage management teams to irrationally delay bankruptcy filings to 
the detriment of all stakeholders.  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 228 
(“The fact that the management of the debtor will not be displaced in favour of an 
outside [insolvency practitioner] encourages timely use of the restructuring 
option.”). 
 163 In a few countries the automatic stay does not restrict all creditor-collection 
actions (e.g., Austria and Bulgaria).  Some countries have a stay, but the stay is 
limited to unsecured claims (e.g., Poland).  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 
30, at 261-64; see also 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 34-35. 
 164 For example, employee claims can rank ahead of secured creditor claims 
in some Member States (e.g., France, Greece, and Spain).  See 2016 COMMISSION 
STUDY, supra note 30, at 124-25. 
 165  Many countries have no special provisions encouraging post-petition 
financing (e.g., Austria, Bulgaria, and Sweden).  Many of the countries that do 
encourage the practice, fail to have specific provisions protecting post-petition 
lenders from clawback actions (e.g., Finland and Ireland).  See id. at 278-80. 
 166 Member States generally allow debtors to pursue preference actions, but 
some have extremely generous look back periods that extend for multiple years 
(e.g., Netherlands, Germany, and Lithuania) while others allow for only a 3-month 
look back period (e.g., Denmark, Finland, and Sweden).  See id. at 147-53. 
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fraudulent transfer 167   actions; (vii) appointment of creditor 
committees; 168  (viii) prepackaged bankruptcy cases; 169  (ix) 
cramdown of dissenting creditor voting classes and attendant 
protections, including the best interests test and absolute priority 
rule;170 and (x) asset sales.171  Further, the length of time necessary to 
resolve complex restructuring cases varies significantly.172 
Variance in substantive law undermines restructuring cases in a 
material way.173  Unpredictability regarding available debtor relief, 
restructuring pathways, and creditor rights precludes successful 
restructurings; failures suppress creditor recoveries, which drive up 
 
 167  Fraudulent transfer actions are a meaningful recovery tool in U.S. 
bankruptcy cases and can represent billion-dollar actions, particularly in 
bankruptcy cases involving prepetition leveraged buyouts.  See, e.g., In re Tribune 
Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 818 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2016) (creditors sought to 
avoid a multi-billion dollar leveraged buyout).  However, fraudulent transfer law 
in the EU is unevenly developed.  For example, in many Member States transactions 
may only be avoided if the debtor intended to damage creditor interests (e.g., Czech 
Republic, Portugal, and Poland).  Further, the statute of limitations varies wildly.  
“In Austria, Croatia, Germany, and Norway the period in which transactions can 
be challenged is 10 years,“ while in other countries it is as short as 2 years (e.g., 
Portugal and Romania).  See 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 159-60. 
 168  The existence, power, and composition of creditor committees varies 
significantly across Member States.  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 
192-93.  Some Member States do not contemplate appointment of a creditors’ 
committee (e.g. Spain, Belgium, and Slovakia).  Id. at 193-95.  In countries that allow 
appointment, courts rarely do so (e.g. Luxembourg and Netherlands).  Id. 
 169 Aside from France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, and Slovenia, Member 
States fail to offer debtors the option of a prepackaged bankruptcy proceeding.  Id. 
at 202. 
 170 ”There is in fact considerable variation on the conditions necessary for 
approval of a restructuring plan in the EU Member States . . . [and it] does not 
appear that the ‘absolute priority’ principle is expressly incorporated in the laws of 
many, if any, EU Member States . . .”  Id. at 239-42. 
 171  The procedures and requirements of asset sales are inconsistent, often 
times resulting in “long drawn out and complicated process[es].”  Id. at 205. 
 172 2014 INSOL STUDY, supra note 59, at 39 (“The length of full insolvency 
proceedings varies considerably in most Member States: in a large number of States 
the average length is two to three years.”) (citation omitted). 
 173  See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 2 (indicating cross-border 
insolvencies often result in liquidation rather than restructuring due to inconsistent 
legal frameworks across Member States); 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 
24 (suggesting “inefficient and divergent insolvency proceedings in the EU 
prevent[] speedier debt restructuring”); CHERUBINI ET AL., supra note 160, at 27 
(asserting lack of harmony between Member States’ insolvency processes impedes 
business reorganization). 
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borrowing costs and limit access to credit.174  Further, ineffective 
restructuring laws force potentially viable companies into 
liquidation where value is lost.175  As noted above, the coalescence 
of these factors inhibits capital markets and undermine growth.  
Without greater harmonization, the EU will not be able to fulfill its 
goals regarding capital market integration. 
b. Experience Deficiencies in the Judiciary 
Specialized bankruptcy courts are one of the most distinctive 
characteristics of the US system. 176   The US federal judiciary is 
divided into geographic regions.  Each region has multiple 
bankruptcy courts that hear only individual and corporate 
bankruptcy matters.177  Further, almost all of these regions have a 
bankruptcy appellate court that hears only appeals from bankruptcy 
proceedings. 178   Bankruptcy judges at both of these levels are 
eminently qualified to handle the nuance of restructuring laws and 
the minutia of bankruptcy disputes.179  The depth and breadth of 
collective experience in the US restructuring system represents an 
overwhelming asset.180  Indeed, there exists “substantial empirical 
evidence to demonstrate that large bankruptcy cases overseen by 
 
 174 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at 15. Several Members States took 
or have taken action independently and have recently enacted or started 
preparatory work to adopt new rules to improve the preventive restructuring and 
second chance framework.  However, these national rules differ widely in content 
and, as a result, provide an uneven level of transparency and protection for 
investors.  Investors may be obstructed from investing cross-border because the 
costs of doing so are much higher than they need to be. 
 175 See id. at 2-3.   
 176  See generally Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural 
Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012) (describing 
the structure of the U.S. bankruptcy system and its central institutions and actors). 
 177 See UCLA-LoPucki Bankr. Rsch. Database, supra note 13.   
 178 See Court Insider: What is a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel?, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 26, 
2012), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2012/11/26/court-insider-what-
bankruptcy-appellate-panel [https://perma.cc/VMV5-FU4Y]. 
 179 See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 77.  
 180 Id. 
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experienced judges have higher success rates.”181  The prospect of a 
successful restructuring is dimmed without an experienced jurist 
formulating necessary relief after weighing competing interests 
among all stakeholders and encouraging settlements, when 
necessary.182 
Member States do not have specialized bankruptcy courts 
comparable to what exists in the United States. 183   With limited 
exception, judges overseeing restructuring cases are not 
specialists. 184   Further, the few judges who do regularly oversee 
restructuring cases invariably lack a comprehensive understanding 
of restructuring concepts because almost all bankruptcy cases in 
their courts are liquidation proceedings or asset sales. 185   For 
example, from 1990 to 2012, restructurings—as opposed to 
liquidations or going concern sales—occurred in Germany in only 
2% of all business insolvencies.186  This phenomenon was duplicated 
across Member States.187 
 
 181 Id. (citing Benjamin Charles Iverson, Joshua Madsen, Wei Wang & Qiping 
Xu, Practice Makes Perfect: Judge Experience and Bankruptcy Outcomes, 28 (July 16, 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084318 [https://perma.cc/WM7W-EAC4]); see 
also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Survival, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
970, 990, 1014 (2015) (concluding that the judge’s experience is “strongly correlated” 
with the survival of the debtor and that “bankruptcy system participants can 
increase the likelihood of the debtor company’s survival simply by shifting cases to 
more experienced judges.”). 
 182 Empirical research supports this conclusion.  Local bankruptcy courts that 
Megacases eschewed in order to forum shop to Delaware had historically heard far 
less chapter 11 bankruptcy cases than local bankruptcy courts in which Megacases 
filed without forum shopping.  Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel Jr., An Efficiency-
Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 
461-63 (2006). 
 183 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 94.  As noted above, due to Brexit 
uncertainty, I have excluded the UK from Member State discussions and assumed 
that the English courts may not be a viable restructuring venue option in upcoming 
years. 
 184 See id. (noting that German restructuring judges are some of the few judges 
in the EU that frequently have documentable knowledge in the area). 
 185 Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 15. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Italy (~5% in 2014), Spain (~10% in 2015), and the UK (~10% in 2016), face 
similar limitations.  Id. 
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The EU acknowledges that a lack of experience across the 
judiciary compromises the bankruptcy system.188  The inexperience 
effect is decidedly negative:  due to a lack of confidence in the 
system, many companies will delay a bankruptcy filing until such 
time as liquidation is the only viable option; the percentage of 
successful restructurings decline and capital markets continue to 
resist cross-border lending.  Further, to the extent that tourism 
regulations limit companies to regions with inexperienced judges, 
those companies will be subject to disparate treatment vis-à-vis 
companies whose central administration happens to be located in a 
Member State with more experienced judges.  This discrepancy 
further undermines the system and the EU’s economic policy 
objectives. 
c. The Bankruptcy Tourism Lever 
Scholars have suggested various means to address the 
harmonization quandary and reorganization inexperience within 
Member States’ judiciary. 189   Though these proposals are 
meaningful, any belief that these issues can be addressed in the 
foreseeable future is misguided.  The EU works through 
recommendations and directives in order to encourage Member 
States to make substantive changes to national law.  The EU has 
repeatedly attempted to steer Member States to optimal 
 
 188 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 4, at Recital 39, art. 24 (acknowledging 
the need for Member States to ensure that its judiciary is properly trained to manage 
restructuring cases); see also Reforms to Dutch Bankruptcy Act Take in Force from 1 
January 2019, OSBORNE CLARKE (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/reforms-to-dutch-bankruptcy-act-take
-in-force-from-1-january-2019/ [https://perma.cc/UR49-MM8H] (noting that the 
Dutch Government sought to address experience deficiencies in their judiciary by 
allowing a restructuring judge overseeing a proceeding the ability to appoint other 
judges to the case who may bring special expertise on complex issues). 
 189 See, e.g., Eidenmüller, supra note 38,  at 28 (proposing that process certainty 
can be bolstered if corporations were allowed to “opt into a European insolvency 
regime in their charter”); Oren Sussman, The Economics of the EU’s Corporate 
Insolvency Law and the Quest for Harmonization by Market Forces, in HANDBOOK OF 
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (2008) (arguing to the extent 
harmonization is sought, harmonization by market forces is preferable to 
harmonization through legislation and bureaucratic processes). 
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restructuring law, but these urgings have been met with inaction.190  
And there is no reason to believe that this intransigence will abate.  
The result is an inherently deficient framework that will preclude 
progress towards economic policy objectives.  It is possible that the 
framework will ultimately evolve into the intended form, but the 
timeline for that evolution seems woefully protracted.  A 
widespread financial correction currently consumes Europe and 
will continue to decimate industries for years. 191   The EU’s 
restructuring framework is ill-equipped to offer predictable or 
comprehensive reorganization outcomes for the myriad 
corporations that will soon be seeking relief.  Government 
intervention can only stem the tide. 
As detailed in Part V, infra, I propose a forum shopping model 
similar to the one currently in place in the United States as a means 
to address the intractable problems within the EU restructuring 
framework.  I believe the EU can easily facilitate bankruptcy 
tourism, and the practice offers unique benefits.  The proposal is 
particularly attractive because the changes can be achieved through 
direct EU action without the need for affirmative legislative action 
from Member States.  I believe the benefits from my proposal can be 
 
 190 See Eidenmüller, supra note 70, at 3-4 (“States such as the UK, Germany and 
Italy, did not even react” to the European Commission’s 2014 Recommendation on 
“a new approach to business failure and insolvency.”). 
 191 See, e.g., EUR. COMM., EUROPEAN ECONOMIC FORECAST 5-11 
 (July 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/economy-
finance/ip132_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H3U-5D5R] (forecasting an incomplete 
recovery in GDP growth by the end of 2021 as tourism and other industries struggle 
to resume in the wake of COVID-19); Hanna Ziady, Europe’s Recession Will be Even 
Deeper than Expected, CNN (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/07/economy/eu-commission-summer-2020-fore
cast/index.html [https://perma.cc/R7DP-YN9L] (emphasizing continued 
lockdown restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic could further slow economic 
recovery); Laurence Norman & Mari Martinez, Coronavirus Projected to Send 
Eurozone Into Steep Recession, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-projected-to-send-eurozone-into-stee
p-recession-11588761057 [https://perma.cc/JQL9-GYSX] (acknowledging “a 
growing consensus that the recent plunge in world-wide economic activity will be 
followed by a slow, halting and uneven recovery”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
AND DEV., CORONAVIRUS: THE WORLD ECONOMY AT RISK 8 (OECD Interim Economic 
Assessment, 2020), http://www.oecd.org/berlin/publikationen/Interim-
Economic-Assessment-2-March-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DH9-RQEN] 
(cautioning lingering trade tensions compound downside risk to recovery due to 
the global pandemic). 
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realized within a relatively short period of time; as opposed to the 
current trajectory, which could take decades. 
However, before moving to the substance of my proposal, I 
acknowledge that some scholars may argue that my proposal creates 
the risk of a pyrrhic victory.  Indeed, scholars have argued that 
bankruptcy tourism is an inequitable practice that undermines 
restructuring systems and produces suboptimal results for creditors 
and stakeholders.192  EU Restructuring Law and, in particular, the 
Recast EIR aggressively restrict bankruptcy tourism; going so far as 
to argue that internal markets will not function properly if parties 
are allowed to engage in the practice.193  Ultimately, what is the 
rationality in facilitating an arguably destabilizing practice? 
In order to begin to answer that question, one must first 
understand the type of controlled tourism that has proliferated in 
the United States.  The next section provides an overview of 
jurisdictional arbitrage in the United States and the perceived 
threats and deficiencies of the practice. 
 
 192 See Lynn LoPucki, Global and Out of Control, 79 AM. BANKR. L. J. 79, 79-103 
(2005) (arguing an international bankruptcy system in which courts hearing forum-
shopped cases cannot be checked by competing courts and will result in corruption 
and displacement of “corporate outsiders who have no means of controlling the 
debtor’s choice of courts”); Lynn LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
143, 143 (2005) (warning under an increasingly universalist regime that creditors of 
a multinational corporation will be harmed through their inability to determine 
which country’s bankruptcy laws apply until the corporation has filed); see also 
Peter Califano, Bankruptcy Reform – Everything You Need to Know Is in This Article, 29 
COM. L. WORLD 8, 9 (2015) (acknowledging criticism leveled at the potential of 
bankruptcy tourism in the U.S. to exclude filing companies’ “management, 
employees, communities, and key constituencies” along with smaller creditors); 
Parikh, supra note 22, at 197 (“[R]ampant forum shopping undermines the 
perception and integrity of the bankruptcy system” by “erod[ing] public confidence 
in the bankruptcy courts” and treating similarly situated parties differently); 
LOPUCKI, supra note 6, at 137-81 (asserting courts hungry for large bankruptcy cases 
cater to case placers at the expense of reaching the most equitable solutions); Lynn 
LoPucki & William Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 34 (1991) 
(suggesting case placers “may be able to manipulate the outcome of the case by 
selecting a forum that will render a favorable decision” while some physically 
distant parties are effectively excluded through relatively high costs to participate). 
 193 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 3 (concentrating most jurisdiction over 
an insolvent debtor within the Member State containing debtor’s “main interests”), 
Recital 4 (“It is necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market to avoid 
incentives for parties to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member 
State to another, seeking to obtain a more favorable legal position . . . .”). 
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING BANKRUPTCY TOURISM THROUGH THE 
LENS OF THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
a. Controlled Tourism and How Permissive Venue Rules are Exploited 
in the United States194 
Bankruptcy Tourism has been ubiquitous in the United States 
over the last thirty years, and the phenomenon’s trend line can be 
established empirically.195  From 2007 to 2012, 69% of publicly held 
companies with approximately $1.2 billion 196  or more in assets 
(“Megacases”) strategically located bankruptcy cases in jurisdictions 
that had no connection to their operations or headquarters in order 
to take advantage of favorable law, court procedures, and jurists 
perceived to be amendable.197  That is a 14% increase compared to 
filings from 1991 to 1996.198  And the practice is more prevalent now.  
Forty-eight of the eighty-eight Megacases filed between 1991 and 
1996 had forum shopped.199  From 2007 to 2012, 110 of the 159 filed 
Megacases had forum shopped.200  Consequently, between the two 
periods, frequency with which Megacases forum shopped grew at a 
statistically significant rate (14%) and the absolute number of 
Megacases that forum shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%).201  
The practice continues unabated.202  From General Motors filing for 
 
 194 This section is reproduced, in part, from Parikh, supra note 22, at 181-92. 
 195 Parikh, supra note 22, at 173-92. 
 196 This number is measured in 2007 dollars.  The benchmark was $500 million 
in 1980 and then was adjusted depending on the year the case was filed.  For 
example, a bankruptcy filed in 2007 would qualify as a Megacase if the debtor(s) 
had assets with a fair market value of at least $1.2 billion.  See UCLA-LOPUCKI 
BANKR. RSCH. DATABASE, supra note 13. 
 197 Parikh, supra note 22, at 177-81. 
 198 See id. at 178. 
 199 See id. at 177. 
 200 See id. 
 201 Id. 
 202  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-839, CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY: STAKEHOLDERS HAVE MIXED VIEWS ON ATTORNEYS’ FEE GUIDELINES AND 
VENUE SELECTION FOR LARGE CHAPTER 11 CASES 3 (2015), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672696.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FJ2-SCF4] 
(finding “many of the companies” engaged in “large Chapter 11 bankruptcies” 
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bankruptcy in New York203 to the Los Angeles Dodgers filing for 
bankruptcy in Delaware,204 the last thirty years has been a golden 
age of bankruptcy tourism in the United States. 
The freedom to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage is an 
unintended consequence of permissive venue provisions in the 
United States.  For a corporate debtor, 28 U.S.C § 1408 provides four 
primary bases for establishing venue in a district:  (1) the debtor’s 
principal place of business in the United States is in the district; (2) 
the debtor’s principal assets in the United States are located in the 
district; (3) the debtor is incorporated in the state in which the 
district is found;205 or (4) a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor 
is pending in the district.206  
i. Principal Place of Business  
A company’s principal place of business is invariably the 
optimal location for that company’s bankruptcy proceedings.  The 
selection of this venue engenders certainty and predictability.  In the 
US, the location of a debtor’s principal place of business is a question 
of objective fact, not subjective intention, to be resolved after 
considering relevant aspects of the debtor’s operations. 207   The 
 
since October 2009 for which they filed in either the Southern District of New York 
or Delaware were headquartered elsewhere). 
 203 Jon Swartz & Kevin McCoy, It’s Official: GM Files for Bankruptcy Protection, 
ABC NEWS (June 1, 2009, 11:36 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=7725901&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/2ERN-5TG4]. 
 204 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 162.  
 205 See Geographic Boundaries of the United States Courts of Appeals and United 
States District Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z3AM-XQPX].  Many states have multiple districts in which a 
debtor can file.  Id.  For instance, California has four districts and multiple 
bankruptcy courts within each district. California Bankruptcy Court Directory, 
CALIFORNIABANKRUPTCY.INFO, http://www.californiabankruptcy.info/court.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YRM-3FNJ].  Thus, under § 1408, a debtor incorporated in 
California can file in any one of the four districts based on its place of incorporation. 
 206 28 U.S.C. § 1408. 
 207 See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., 150 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(“[T]he principal place of business inquiry is primarily a factual one . . . .”); In re 
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overarching question involves where the debtor, in the aggregate, 
manages and initiates its business.208 
Two primary tests are used to answer this question. 209   The 
“nerve center” test advocates a more limited inquiry, 210  and 
instructs courts to “look to the place where the debtor’s major, 
business management decisions are made.  Under [this test], 
wherever the debtor’s primary decision-makers are congregated 
will be the principal place of business.” 211   In other words, the 
corporate headquarters and offices are invariably the principal place 
of business.212  The “operational” test probes further.213  This test 
evaluates the debtor’s day-to-day operations, considering not just 
where major business management decisions are made but also the 
location of:  (i) the debtor’s books, records, accounting, and other 
management information; (ii) personnel, equipment, and assets; (iii) 
income generating activities and where debts were incurred; (iv) 
bank accounts; and (v) day-to-day activities.214  The Recast EIR’s 
COMI test is similar to the operational test.215 
In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,216 the Supreme Court sought to resolve a 
circuit split concerning the meaning of the phrase “principal place 
of business” provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) for purposes of 
determining whether federal diversity jurisdiction existed.217  The 
Court resolved the split in favor of the nerve center test, a choice that 
 
Condor Expl., LLC, 294 B.R. 370, 374 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“[W]hat constitutes the 
principal place of business of a corporation is a question of objective fact, not 
subjective intention.”) (citing In re Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 133 B.R. 562, 564 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)). 
 208 See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 795 (arguing the principal place of 
business “is likely to be the place where its management decisions are made”); In re 
Condor Expl., 294 B.R. at 374 (providing factors to determine an entity’s principal 
place of business). 
 209  See Parikh, supra note 22, at 182-83. A few courts have used the “center of 
corporate activities” test, which focuses on the center of a corporation’s production 
or service activities. 
 210 In re Condor Expl., 294 B.R. at 374.   
 211 Id. (citing In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 788). 
 212 Id. 
 213 Id. 
 214 See id.; In re Dock of the Bay, Inc., 24 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 215 See Section II.b.iv., supra. 
 216 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
 217 Id. at 80. 
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the Court believed would engender greater administrative 
simplicity. 218   The Court explained that the “[principal place of 
business] should normally be the place where the corporation 
maintains its headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the 
actual center of direction, control, and coordination . . . and not 
simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”219  
The Court found that the operational test was too complex and 
forced judges to consider a variety of criteria and “weigh corporate 
functions, assets and revenues different in kind, one from the 
other.”220   The Court concluded that the test led to inconclusive 
decisions—needlessly complicating cases, fostering disputes and 
appeals, eating up time and money, and ultimately diminishing “the 
likelihood that results and settlements [would] reflect a claim’s legal 
and factual merits.”221 
The Hertz ruling does not foreclose discussion on the definition 
of the principal place of business.  Courts prior to the Hertz ruling 
noted that differing policy considerations suggest that “tests for a 
corporation’s principal place of business in diversity cases should 
not be imported wholesale into bankruptcy venue law.” 222  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the differing policy objectives 
between § 1332 and § 1408, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
“principal place of business” in § 1332 must inform any 
interpretation of the identical phrase in § 1408.223  The Hertz ruling, 
 
 218 Id. at 92–93. 
 219 Id. at 93. 
 220 Id. at 90–92, 96. 
 221 Id. at 94. 
 222 In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 206 B.R. 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (citing 
In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)), aff’d 
150 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 1998).  Note that § 1332 and § 1408 have differing policy 
objectives.  Diversity jurisdiction was designed to “provide a separate forum for 
out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making 
available to them the benefits and safeguards of Federal courts.” S. REP. NO. 85-1830, 
at 4 (1958).  Supreme Court precedent in this area has often sought to limit a 
corporation’s ability to manufacture diversity and improperly remove cases to 
federal court.  The language of § 1408 serves not to protect debtors from local courts 
and local juries, but to allow flexibility in choosing venue.  The policy concerns 
guiding these two sections have “little or nothing in common.”  In re Commonwealth 
Oil, 596 F.2d at 1247 n.17. 
 223 See In re W. Coast Interventional Pain Med., Inc., 435 B.R. 569, 575 n.2 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (asserting Hertz’s nerve center approach to principal place 
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for all intents and purposes, mandates the nerve center test in 
evaluating a corporation’s principal place of business.  This means 
that corporate defendants have less flexibility in arguing diversity 
under § 1332, and corporate debtors have slightly less flexibility in 
attempting to justify their choice of venue under § 1408. 
The inquiry under this basis is qualitative and, therefore, limits 
forum shopping options.  A corporate debtor could attempt to move 
its headquarters and offices of its key decision-makers in 
anticipation of a bankruptcy filing, but such an undertaking is 
prohibitively disruptive for entities of any significance.  Further, the 
qualitative nature of the judicial inquiry as to this basis limits this 
option.  Consequently, in the United States, few debtors attempt to 
alter their principal place of business in order to forum shop.224 
ii. Principal Assets 
The term “assets” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code but has 
been interpreted broadly 225  to include not only manufacturing 
facilities, inventory, and equipment, but also rights under a lease or 
sublease, shares of stock, accounts receivable, net operating losses, 
and pending lawsuits, inter alia.226  In evaluating this basis for venue, 
courts consider the geographic location of the assets that are 
principally used in the operation of the debtor’s business.227  To be 
considered, the assets must be related to business in which the 
 
of business for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction also applies in bankruptcy 
cases); In re Lakota Canyon Ranch Dev., LLC., No. 11-03739-8-RDD, 2011 WL 
5909630, at *1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 21, 2011) (citing the Hertz ruling and adopting 
the nerve center test in determining principal place of business), as amended (June 
23, 2011). 
 224 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 179. 
 225 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (defining property of the estate as “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”). 
 226 See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (including 
net operating losses as part of bankruptcy property); In re Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122, 135-36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (including rights 
under a lease as bankruptcy assets); In re J & L Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 186 B.R. 
388, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (including accounts receivable as bankruptcy assets). 
 227 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192, at 19 (arguing companies move 
their headquarters in order to obtain a favorable venue). 
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debtor is engaged.228  Bankruptcy courts will generally engage in a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. 229   A quantitative analysis 
requires that a court consider the dollar value of the assets in relation 
to value of the debtor’s overall portfolio of assets.230  A qualitative 
analysis requires that a court consider the importance of the assets 
to the debtor’s operations and reorganization prospects.231  Only one 
district can qualify as the place where a company’s principal assets 
are located.232  Therefore, the bankruptcy courts will often have to 
compare the assets located in one district with those located in 
another.233 
Not coincidentally, this criterion also tends to be the one that is 
the most difficult to manipulate.  Large corporations invariably have 
assets located in a variety of districts; moving or selling a portion of 
these assets in order to establish venue in a given district could be 
difficult and unnecessary considering the other bases available for 
forum shopping.  That being said, because of the broad reading of 
the term “assets,” this basis affords corporations with less fixed 
assets significant flexibility.  For example, a corporation that owns 
limited assets, of which cash or cash equivalents are a primary part, 
could simply transfer cash into a bank account located in the desired 
jurisdiction prior to filing for bankruptcy. 
 
 228 See In re Newport Creamery, Inc., 265 B.R. 614, 616 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) 
(stating that either a corporation’s principal place of business or its principal assets 
may be used to establish proper venue). 
 229 See, e.g., In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (using both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses). 
 230 See id. at 135-36 (emphasizing the importance of properly identifying a 
debtor company’s principal assets to allow for a useful numerical comparison with 
the company’s overall assets). 
 231 Id. at 136. 
 232 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 192, at 17 (stating a debtor can only 
have one principal place of business at any given time). 
 233 See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (determining whether venue was 
appropriate by comparing the assets of the holding company to those of its 
subsidiaries that were within different districts). 
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iii. Place of Incorporation / Registered Office 
A corporate debtor’s place of incorporation—known as the 
“registered office” in the EU234—represents a venue basis that is 
frequently used to facilitate tourism. 
Section 1408 of Title 28 provides that a “person” can rely on 
domicile or residence in selecting venue.235  Section 1 of Title 1 of the 
U.S. Code defines the term “person” to include natural persons as 
well as fictitious business entities, such as partnerships and 
corporations.236  A natural person can clearly have a domicile and a 
residence.  “Residence” is generally where someone is living. 237  
“Domicile” is generally understood to refer to the place where one 
resides coupled with the intention to remain; the term can also refer 
to the place where one intends to return.238 
However, § 1408’s language indicates that these terms can also 
conceivably apply to a corporate debtor.239  Though it is unclear how 
a corporation could have a “domicile” or “residence” aside from its 
corporate headquarters or location of principal assets, many courts 
assume that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation.240  
In these jurisdictions, corporate debtors have immense flexibility.  A 
corporation’s state of incorporation can be changed relatively 
 
 234 See MOSS, FLETCHER & ISAACS, supra note 45.  
 235 11 U.S.C. § 1408. 
 236 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, 
as well as individuals.”). 
 237 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 184. 
 238  In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 202 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
 239 28 U.S.C. § 1408. 
 240 See, e.g., In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(stating a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation); In re Innovative 
Commc’n Co., 358 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the 
state of incorporation”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 461, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(“[A] corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”); In 
re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (finding Delaware 
to be a proper venue since the debtor was incorporated in that state); In re EB Capital 
Mgmt., No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) 
(“A corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”). 
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easily.241  Changing a corporation’s state of incorporation to secure 
venue may be worthwhile in cases involving a limited number of 
high-stakes issues in which the court before which the bankruptcy 
case is tried may be dispositive.  Furthermore, a corporate debtor is 
generally seen as having the right to file in any district located 
within its state of incorporation. 242   Consequently, this basis for 
venue is allowing forum shopping not only among states but also 
among districts within the same state. 
The only real constraint on a corporate debtor relying on its state 
of incorporation is that it must have been incorporated in the state 
of its bankruptcy case for the 180 days immediately preceding its 
filing or, in the alternative, the longer portion of such a period.243  
But considering that the vast majority of Megacases involve months 
and sometimes years of pre-bankruptcy negotiations, the 180-day 
look-back period poses a minor obstacle.  Indeed, in my 2012 study, 
one-third of the corporate debtors in the study group relied on this 
basis in establishing venue, and all fifty-three forum shopped.244  
Further, these fifty-three forum shoppers represent almost half of 
the total number of forum shoppers in my study group. 
iv. Affiliate Filing 
The final basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice is that one 
of the debtor’s “affiliates” has a pending case in the district.245 
 
 241 See, e.g., Alison Torbitt, Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility: 
Possible State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through Corporate Law 
Reform, 88 OR. L. REV. 581, 595 (2009) (stating a business can easily change its state 
of incorporation). 
 242 See Parikh, supra note 22, at 186.  
 243 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1). 
 244  Parikh, supra note 22, at 185. 
 245 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (stating that a title 11 case can be brought in a district 
“in which there is a pending case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate”).  
Though not technically binding, § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term 
“affiliate” to mean: 
(A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power 
to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the 
debtor, other than an entity that holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary 
or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such 
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Surprisingly, this venue basis was traditionally one of the least 
controversial provisions of the venue rules.  Without this basis for 
venue, various companies within the same corporate family could 
be forced to file for bankruptcy in different districts.  A wholesale 
adjudication of the corporate family’s bankruptcy cases would be 
virtually impossible.  There would be considerable waste of judicial 
resources, not to mention the financial and logistical burden on the 
debtor’s officers and legal counsel.  The net result would be a 
significant reduction in any chance of a meaningful reorganization.  
Notwithstanding this sound policy, the wording of § 1408(2) 
provides virtually no restrictions on an affiliate filing, and this has 
allowed for debtor gamesmanship.  
Today, § 1408(2) is used in a manner that bears no relation to the 
policy basis of the provision.  The most common method for abusing 
this provision is for the corporate debtor to locate a subsidiary that 
had been incorporated in a favorable district—a district in which the 
primary corporate debtor could not otherwise file its bankruptcy 
petition.  Legal counsel for the corporate debtor prepares the entire 
corporate family for bankruptcy.  But instead of filing the entire 
family together, legal counsel files the subsidiary’s petition in the 
favorable district first to establish venue.  Then, within a matter of 
minutes, the rest of the corporate family files their bankruptcy 
petitions in the same district on the premise that an affiliate’s 
bankruptcy case is pending in the district. 
 
securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact 
exercised such power to vote; (B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose 
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, 
or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more 
of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that 
holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole 
discretionary power to vote such securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, 
if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote; (C) person 
whose business is operated under a lease or operating agreement by a 
debtor, or person substantially all of whose property is operated under an 
operating agreement with the debtor; or (D) entity that operates the 
business or substantially all of the property of the debtor under a lease or 
operating agreement.  
11 U.S.C. § 101(2).  However, this definition is not binding on United States 
bankruptcy judges because it is limited to sections within Title 11 of the U.S. Code, 
and venue matters are addressed in Title 28. 
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Debtor gamesmanship can come in other permutations.  In some 
cases, a corporate family has no subsidiaries that are able to file in 
the desired district.  This is a rare circumstance but one that is easily 
circumvented because of the permissive language of § 1408(2).  In 
such a case, the company merely creates and incorporates a shell 
subsidiary in the favorable district and then follows the procedure 
outlined above.  The shell subsidiary has no employees or 
meaningful operations or assets, but the fact that it is incorporated 
in the favorable district is sufficient—even when the incorporation 
occurs in the days immediately before the bankruptcy filing.246  For 
example, in 2005, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., filed for bankruptcy in the 
Southern District of New York. 247   The corporation was 
headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida, and had no connection to 
New York.248  The debtor was able to manufacture venue for the case 
by incorporating a subsidiary in New York twelve days prior to the 
filing and invoking the so-called “affiliate rule.”249 
This basis and the state-of-incorporation basis work together to 
facilitate forum shopping.  Forty-five of the 159 corporate debtors in 
my 2012 study group (28%) relied on the affiliate filing hook.250  
 
 246 Debtors have attempted to use this technique in many instances.  See In re 
Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining debtor’s 
only connection to New York was its incorporation in the state on the eve of 
bankruptcy); United States Trustee’s Omnibus Reply to Objections to United States 
Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a), to 
Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 6–7, In re Patriot Coal 
Corp., 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 12-12900) (arguing that the 
debtors’ chief financial officer essentially admitted to incorporating two affiliates in 
the weeks before the bankruptcy filing for the sole purpose of establishing venue in 
the Southern District of New York); Motion of Buffalo Rock Company to Transfer 
Venue of the Debtors’ Bankruptcy Cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division or Such Other District Where 
Venue Would Be Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 at 1, In re Winn-Dixie Stores, 
Inc., No. 05-11063 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Buffalo Rock] 
(explaining that debtor had incorporated an affiliate just twelve days before the 
bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in the Southern District of New York).  
But see Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee’s Motion, 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(1), to Transfer Venue of 
These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 43-53, In re Patriot Coal, 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y.) (No. 12-12900) (arguing that case should not be transferred pursuant to 
the court’s rationale in In re Winn-Dixie). 
 247 Buffalo Rock, supra note 246. 
 248 Id. at 11. 
 249 Id. at 1. 
 250 Parikh, supra note 22, at 190-91. 
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Forty-four of those forty-five debtors forum shopped.251  Further, 40% 
of the forum shoppers in my study group relied on this basis.252 
b. Assessing Bankruptcy Tourism 
Tourism’s prevalence in the U.S. bankruptcy process is 
undisputed.  However, despite the consistent use of the phrase as a 
pejorative, the phenomenon’s effect on the bankruptcy process is 
unclear.  Bankruptcy scholars have advanced a number of 
theoretical arguments that support eliminating the practice,253 three 
of which are particularly applicable here. 
Primarily, bankruptcy tourism can undermine judicial 
legitimacy and the perception of a restructuring system’s integrity.  
The process appears subject to manipulation when high-profile 
restructuring cases repeatedly flee to specific courts.  In other words, 
certain courts appear willing to give corporate debtors and other key 
decision makers the outcomes they seek.  This perception erodes 
public confidence in the court system and affects creditors, 
employees, unions, and other constituents excluded from the 
perceived backroom dealings.  Many stakeholders face limited 
visibility into restructuring proceedings when those proceedings 
occur in jurisdictions far removed from a debtor’s central 
administration.  Without transparency, a restructuring system’s 
fairness can be called into question.  Judiciaries strive to ensure that 
similarly situated parties receive similar treatment.254  Bankruptcy 
tourism may lead to greater discrepancies in substantive laws, 
which may fuel disparate treatment. 
Further, an elevated level of bankruptcy tourism may produce 
suboptimal laws and legal interpretations.  Tourism can incentivize 
government legislators to enact overly permissive “debtor-friendly” 
 
 251 Id. at 191. 
 252 Id. 
 253 See id. at 192-98; see also sources cited supra note 192. 
 254 See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature Of The Judicial Process 33-34 
(1921). 
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laws in order to lure companies to their jurisdiction.255  These laws 
create an imbalance in the restructuring process that favors debtors 
and insiders in the short-term, but could decimate stakeholder value 
over the long-term. 256   As a corollary, judges in a particular 
jurisdiction may hold similar objectives and interpret existing laws 
in a way that is similarly advantageous to debtors and insiders but 
ultimately harmful to creditors and other stakeholders.257   These 
dynamics cause a few select courts to be oversubscribed.  With 
permissive venue rules, corporate debtors are able to methodically 
select courts that rule in ways that further debtor objectives—which 
can be diametrically opposed to stakeholder objectives.  The favored 
courts gain the power to dictate the interpretation of key provisions 
because other courts are rarely asked to adjudicate these matters.  
Ultimately, corporate tourists endorse certain courts’ adjudication of 
key restructuring issues and, in many cases, are voicing their 
disapproval of how other courts have resolved—or are expected to 
resolve—such issues.  But the interpretations by the favored courts 
may be too debtor-friendly and ultimately suppress creditor 
recoveries and undermine rehabilitation prospects.  Without 
discourse across courts, these inaccuracies remain unchallenged and 
may be strengthened by repeated application to a canon of cases. 
 
 255 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 182, at 434.  In the shadow of Brexit, the 
Dutch government enacted the Modernization Bankruptcy Procedure Act, which 
offers a more efficient and faster restructuring process that may lure companies 
unable or unwilling to rely on the English courts in upcoming years. See Reforms to 
Dutch Bankruptcy Act Take In Force from 1 January 2019, OSBORNE CLARK (Nov. 16, 
2018), https://www.osborneclarke.com/insights/reforms-to-dutch-bankruptcy-
act-take-in-force-from-1-january-2019/ [https://perma.cc/2VKU-FTBC].   
 256  For example, a government may ease the requirements for a court to 
approve a plan of reorganization when multiple classes of creditors object to the 
plan.  This benefits a company that is focused on a reorganization.  However, the 
permissive review could enable the confirmation of a plan that has fundamental 
defects that increase recidivism risk—the fear that the company will stumble back 
into bankruptcy within a relatively short period of time—which ultimately wastes 
resources and destroys value.  See Parikh, supra note 22, at 192-98. 
 257 See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 33-34.  For example, a “debtor-friendly” 
judge may refuse to allow an insolvency practitioner to investigate alleged 
malfeasance and embezzlement committed by management, insiders, and senior 
lenders.  The judge may not want her court to have the reputation of allowing these 
parties—who have significant input in the location of a restructuring proceeding—
to face potentially frivolous investigations.  However, the decision to protect these 
parties may preclude the company from recovering funds essential to a successful 
restructuring, forcing the company to liquidate to the detriment of all other 
stakeholders.  See Parikh, supra note 22, at 192-98. 
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When a company files a restructuring proceeding in a 
jurisdiction far from its COMI, officials from the government of its 
central administration, as well as many of its creditors and 
employees, may be prohibited from participating meaningfully in 
the case.  This disenfranchisement can exclude key stakeholders 
from a process that most directly impacts them.  The result may be 
inequitable as key stakeholders are subject to dramatic alterations in 
their rights and benefits but are unable to participate in the process 
that brings about these effects.  Further, regulations and substantive 
laws from a tourist debtor’s home country may be ignored or fail to 
be properly implemented by the host court for a tourist’s 
restructuring proceeding.258 
c. Is Bankruptcy Tourism Deleterious? 
EU Restructuring Law and, in particular, the Recast EIR 
aggressively restrict bankruptcy tourism for the reasons delineated 
above, among others.259  This posture is premised in large part on 
objections formulated by bankruptcy scholars and policymakers.260  
The fact that these objections are primarily theoretical is extremely 
revealing.  The United States has been in the midst of a 30-year 
golden age of bankruptcy tourism.  If widespread tourism 
undermines bankruptcy systems and produces suboptimal results 
for creditors and stakeholders, the phenomenon’s deleterious effects 
should be apparent empirically.  But there is no empirical research 
supporting these criticisms.261 
 
 258 Some scholars have also argued that case pooling in just a few courts is 
inefficient.  Judges in oversubscribed jurisdictions are overburdened while judges 
in other courts are underutilized.  Further, tourism may create an economic 
deprivation for certain locales.  Large bankruptcy cases create work for local 
attorneys and fuel dining and hospitality businesses.  When large corporations 
engage in tourism, local communities are deprived of significant revenue.  See 
VENUE REPORT, supra note 29, at 50-58 (“Based upon estimates from Bloomberg 
Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home jurisdictions over the past 
13 years has drained nearly $4 billion from local economies.”). 
 259 See Part IV.b, supra.   
 260 See id.    
 261  Professor Lynn M. LoPucki has come the closest to successfully 
condemning tourism empirically.  In The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in 
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 The lack of identifiable consequences raises an interesting 
question: could bankruptcy tourism be superlative?  Indeed, the 
practice is a long-standing fixture of the preeminent bankruptcy 
system in the world.262  The U.S. bankruptcy system is described as 
“the model to which European restructuring laws should aspire.”263  
How can a central feature of this bankruptcy system be deleterious?  
At some point, I believe that a study can be designed to empirically 
test this question.  I will not attempt to speculate on the structure of 
such a study or what the results will indicate.  However, it would be 
indefensible for bankruptcy scholars to refuse to consider that such 
a study may establish that controlled264 bankruptcy tourism—the 
phrase I use to describe the type of tourism apparent in the United 
 
Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
231 (2001), Professor LoPucki—along with Sara D. Kalin—established that from 
1983 to 1996, the refiling rates for companies that had matriculated through the 
Delaware bankruptcy courts were significantly higher than for all other bankruptcy 
courts.  LoPucki and Kalin argued that the abnormally high recidivism rates were 
the product of Delaware courts being too “lax” in their standards for approving 
plan confirmation—ordering relief and confirming plans that they knew were 
inappropriate—and the consequence of a blatant design to encourage forum 
shopping to their courts.  Though the findings were quite noteworthy at the time, 
the data for filings in the following decade established that the recidivism rate 
regressed to align with national averages.  But see Ruth Sarah Lee, Delaware’s 
Relevance in Chapter 22: Who is “Courting Failure” Now?, 31 REV. BANK. & FIN. L. 443, 
468-73 (2011) (establishing that from 1997 to 2004, Delaware cases had similar 
failure rates as non-Delaware cases); see also Stephen J. Lubben, Delaware’s 
Irrelevance, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 267, 271-72, 279 (2008) (finding that there 
was no “statistically significant difference in refiling rates” for cases in or outside 
Delaware based on data of public companies with more than $100 million in assets 
who filed bankruptcy cases between 1992 and 2002). 
 262 See DOING BUSINESS REPORT, supra note 29. 
 263 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 219. 
 264 I describe the brand of tourism found in the United States as “controlled” 
because—despite the latitude distressed corporations enjoy in selecting a 
bankruptcy forum—a bankruptcy court enjoys full discretion to transfer a case to 
another court if the filing is improper or if transfer serves “the interest of justice 
or . . . the convenience of the parties [in the case].”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2); 28 
U.S.C. § 1412.  Courts regularly use this transfer power as a check on aggressive 
forum shopping.  See In re Caesars Ent. Operating Co., No. 15-10047, 2015 WL 
495259 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 2, 2015) (holding case originally filed in Delaware 
bankruptcy court to be transferred to bankruptcy court in the Northern District of 
Illinois); In re Patriot Coal Corp., 482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding case 
originally filed in the Southern District of New York bankruptcy court to be 
transferred to bankruptcy court in the Eastern District of Missouri); see also Harvey 
R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1987, 1995-96 (2002). 
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States—is a necessary component of an efficient and effective 
bankruptcy system.  If true, the EU’s attempt to eliminate the 
practice may in fact undermine its economic objectives.  Further, 
even if bankruptcy tourism is not superlative, facilitating the 
practice may represent the most efficient means within the EU’s 
arsenal to address the two primary intractable problems embedded 
in its restructuring framework.  In other words, tourism may be a 
necessary evil due to the unique vagaries of the EU restructuring 
framework.  By aggressively policing abusive tourism, the EU is also 
restricting controlled tourism. 
In the following section, I detail how the EU can address 
structural and legal obstacles by facilitating bankruptcy tourism. 
V. THE CATHEDRAL IN ANOTHER LIGHT: FACILITATING 
CONTROLLED TOURISM IN ORDER TO ADDRESS THE EU’S 
INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS 
Previous sections explored the European Union’s economic 
policy objectives and how its corporate restructuring framework is 
being modified to advance these objectives.  Despite these changes, 
the framework is plagued by two intractable problems undermining 
its economic policy objectives: 1) significant divergence of 
substantive restructuring law across Member States; and 2) lack of 
restructuring experience in the judiciary.  Few scholars have 
attempted to formulate an optimal means to address these issues. 
In the following section, I argue that there is a low likelihood that 
Member States will modify substantive law to a degree necessary to 
afford any semblance of certainty for parties drawn into complex 
restructuring matters.  In other words, I argue that the idea of 
impending harmonization is a myth, and the same bleak outlook 
applies to the possibility of meaningful judicial training as to 
fundamental restructuring concepts. 
Consequently, I urge the EU to embrace the next best alternative: 
facilitating controlled bankruptcy tourism in order to allow for the 
creation of judicial hubs with optimal law and experienced jurists.  
The following section explains why the increased prevalence of 
bankruptcy tourism may be particularly appealing in the EU. 
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a. The Laboratory Theory and Advancing Restructuring Laws Through 
Tourism 
As noted above, the harmonization quandary is well known, but 
the ability to address the problem in a meaningful way is elusive.  
The EU works through recommendations and directives in order to 
encourage Member States to make substantive changes to national 
law.265  However, these urgings have been met with inaction.266  And 
there is significant variance in substantive restructuring law across 
Member States.267  The likelihood of any semblance of uniformity in 
the foreseeable future—even as to basic restructuring provisions—
is abysmal.  This is a key distinguishing feature between the EU and 
U.S. bankruptcy systems.  The U.S. system is built on one legal code 
and implemented through courts within one federal judiciary 
system.  Certainly, incongruence does exist across different regional 
circuit courts in the United States, but the range of variance on 
substantive legal issues does not materially undermine creditor risk 
assessment or recoveries.268 
The disparity between the EU and U.S. bankruptcy systems may 
justify the EU embracing controlled tourism.  Indeed, it is unlikely 
that a harmonized restructuring system promulgating optimal 
law—as defined by the EU itself—will be available to EU companies 
in most Member States.  But the laboratory theory offers a path 
forward. 
The laboratory theory, most succinctly described by Justice 
Brandeis’ dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,269 provides that 
states within the U.S. federal system represent laboratories and may 
choose to develop innovative statutory approaches to social and 
economic problems.270  To the extent that an approach proves to be 
optimal, other states and even the federal government may adopt 
the approach and standardize it.  The EU could choose to embrace 
this theory and afford Member States freedom to explore distinctive 
 
 265 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 288, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 171-72. 
 266 See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 3-4.  
 267 See Section III.a, supra. 
 268 See generally VENUE REPORT, supra note 39. 
 269 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932). 
 270 Id. at 82. 
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restructuring laws.  Other scholars have already noted this 
possibility, 271  but what the current literature overlooks is that 
tourism accelerates the laboratory theory’s effect in a restructuring 
marketplace.272 
Imagine an alternative regulatory environment in the EU more 
akin to what exists in the United States. A progressive Member 
State—Luxembourg, for example—determines that attracting 
corporate bankruptcy cases from outside its borders can be 
extremely beneficial to its local economy.  As a result, this Member 
State enacts a more effective and predictable restructuring system, 
including changes to substantive law and procedure.273  As a critical 
 
 271 See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware? 54 VAND. L. REV. 
309, 314 (2001). 
 272 I acknowledge that the prevalent practice in the EU over the last few years 
is to file for bankruptcy only the financial holding company of a corporate family, 
keeping subsidiaries out of the process and effectuating a deleveraging by relying 
on applicable intercreditor agreements.  However, these types of restructuring 
cases fail to address many key operational and structural issues, representing half 
measures that will not be as prevalent as the current economic correction evolves.  
For example, the finance holding company of a distressed apparel retailer may be 
able to rely on a restructuring proceeding to gain lender accommodations that allow 
it to avoid a payment default and improve liquidity, but the retailer will not be able 
to actually reject commercial leases or make other fundamental changes essential to 
improving its operations unless it includes its operating subsidiaries in the 
restructuring process.  Without that, the restructuring is one-dimensional and fails 
to secure many of the benefits that make Chapter 11 proceedings in the US 
transformative.  Further, Article 7 of the Recast EIR provides that the national law 
of the country hosting the main restructuring proceeding is dispositive as to a 
number of key issues, including the claims process, the respective powers of the 
debtor and restructuring practitioner, contract rejection, and avoidance actions, 
inter alia.  See Recast EIR, supra note 122, at art. 7.  Consequently, imagine a distressed 
corporate family considering a restructuring proceeding in order to clean up its 
capital structure but also to renegotiate with commercial landlords across the EU 
and attack a disastrous leveraged buyout that occurred 3 years ago.  The national 
law of the country in which the main proceeding is opened will be extremely 
important.  In this case—and others like it—the ability to forum shop by changing 
a registered office would be extremely valuable, at the very least, because Member 
States have divergent statutes of limitation on fraudulent transfer actions, as well 
as different criteria in order to establish a claim.  See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 182, 
at 434.  Ultimately, there are cases where a COMI shift based on registered office 
will be the only option because the central administration and assets of the key 
entity cannot be timely moved.  My proposals merely put more jurisdictional 
options on the table in order to afford debtors flexibility. 
 273 Many jurisdictions seek to attract corporate bankruptcy filings in order to 
boost local economies and professional industries.  See Singapore Enacts New 
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mass of companies—including ones from outside the borders of this 
Member State—secures the benefits of this system, creditor 
recoveries improve and more financially viable companies are able 
to successfully reorganize.  The migration may also encourage other 
countries to reform their restructuring laws, further enhancing 
recoveries. 274   Even distressed companies located outside of the 
progressive Member State are able to rely on more predictable 
creditor outcomes and initiate meaningful out-of-court negotiations 
with this baseline.  As outcomes improve, borrowing costs decline 
and credit is more accessible. The possibility of forum shopping 
encourages corporate managers to initiate restructuring discussions 
at an earlier stage of deterioration in order to secure a venue in a 
desirable jurisdiction.  More importantly, accelerating restructuring 
negotiations improves in-court and out-of-court restructuring 
outcomes and—in some cases—may entirely negate the need for a 
restructuring filing. 
b. Forum Shopping Can Help Address Experience Deficiencies in the 
Judiciary 
With limited exceptions, judges overseeing restructuring cases 
in Member States are not specialists.275  Further, the few judges who 
 
Corporate Bankruptcy Law in Bid to Become Center for International Debt Restructuring, 
JONES DAY (May/June 2017), 
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2017/05/singapore-enacts-new-corpor
ate-bankruptcy-law-in-bid-to-become-center-for-international-debt-restructuring 
[https://perma.cc/K39T-4GBM]; see also McCormack & Wan, supra note 29, at 97 
(explaining that Singapore’s recent reforms to its restructuring laws are a blatant 
attempt to encourage international companies to locate their restructuring cases in 
Singapore); VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 56 (“Based upon estimates from 
Bloomberg Businessweek, the flood of companies fleeing their home jurisdictions 
over the past 13 years has drained nearly $4 billion from local economies.”). 
 274 For example, in 2011 bankruptcy tourism by German companies prompted 
reform of Germany’s restructuring laws.  See Regierungsentwurf [Cabinet Draft], 
Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 17/5712, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/057/1705712.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2YTH-Y763] (Ger.) (noting that companies relocated their head 
office to England because of the perception that restructuring the company under 
English law appeared to be more advantageous; this phenomenon highlighted 
weaknesses in German law). 
 275 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 94.   
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do regularly oversee restructuring cases invariably lack a 
comprehensive understanding of restructuring concepts because 
almost all cases in their courts are liquidation proceedings or asset 
sales.276 
As noted above, the EU acknowledges that a lack of experience 
across the judiciary compromises the bankruptcy system, which 
undermines the EU’s economic policy objectives.  Controlled forum 
shopping would afford a subset of the EU judiciary repeated 
exposure to complex restructuring cases (the “EU Magnet Judges”).  
The United States has witnessed this with the bankruptcy courts in 
New York and Delaware.277  Controlled tourism has allowed judges 
in these courts to review a significant volume of complex 
restructuring cases, facilitating familiarity and expertise with hyper-
technical issues that could overwhelm judges in other districts.278  
The development of these judicial hubs in the EU would instill 
valuable experience that cannot be replicated through EU training 
mandates.  This is arguably the optimal scenario for the EU because, 
as noted above, the prospect of developing an experienced 
restructuring judiciary across the EU is unlikely. 
c. Creating Judicial Hubs to Address Intractable Legal and Structural 
Problems 
To the extent that (i) harmonization of substantive restructuring 
laws; and (ii) an experienced judiciary to implement these laws are 
both unlikely to materialize across Member States in the foreseeable 
future, the judicial-hub model described above offers the EU a way 
to possibly address its intractable legal and structural problems. 
Over time, tourism supports the development of hubs for 
optimal restructuring laws and experienced judges.  Countries 
wishing to host these hubs may be more inclined to adopt EU 
restructuring policy suggestions.  If successful, judges in these hubs 
will repeatedly encounter meaningful restructuring issues and 
develop a thoughtful approach to key, case-dispositive issues.  As 
detailed in Part II.a., predictability allows companies and creditors 
 
 276 See Eidenmüller, supra note 38, at 22-23. 
 277 See VENUE REPORT, supra note 39, at 74-76. 
 278 See id. 
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to formulate a range of in-court restructuring outcomes with a high 
degree of certainty.  This data informs and facilitates out-of-court 
restructuring negotiations and improves outcomes.  Experienced 
judges also accelerate case speed, which increases the likelihood of 
a successful restructuring while also lowering process costs. 279  
These framework dynamics could allow the EU to enjoy the benefits 
of the virtuous cycle without actually addressing key legal and 
structural deficiencies. 
In the following section, based on the possibility that controlled 
bankruptcy tourism may allow the EU to further its economic policy 
objectives, I propose legislative changes that will encourage the 
potentially beneficial aspects of tourism but avoid negative 
externalities that the practice can create. 
VI. EU RESTRUCTURING LAW IN A NEW LIGHT 
The previous sections detail my novel assessment that controlled 
bankruptcy tourism may be necessary in the short term to fulfill the 
EU’s economic policy objectives.  This section proposes legislative 
changes to the Recast EIR that will thoughtfully promote the practice 
but minimize the risk of destructive jurisdictional arbitrage. 
a. COMI and Incorporation Theory: Offering Debtors Options and 
Certainty 
A debtor’s COMI guides the venue decision in the EU.  COMI is 
described as “the place where the debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests on a regular basis and is therefore 
ascertainable by third parties.”280  The COMI evaluation demands a 
factually intensive, qualitative assessment.281   The import of this 
demand on the judiciary, debtors, and creditors appears to be 
softened by the presumption that the location of a debtor’s 
 
 279 See id. 
 280 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 3 (EC). 
 281 See Section II.b.iii., supra. 
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registered office establishes COMI.282  However, the Recast EIR and 
CJEU case law make clear that this presumption is a weak one.283  
Various recitals in the Recast EIR emphasize that the genesis for the 
registered office presumption was the impression that a 
corporation’s central administration would invariably be located in 
the country of its registered office. 284   This premise cannot be 
reconciled with the structure of modern multi-national 
corporations. 
All dimensions of the modern corporation are designed to 
optimize operations and revenue, while limiting potential exposure.  
For example, a corporation’s registered office may have been 
selected to take advantage of favorable laws, but its central 
administration may be located in a different country due to various 
operational and business reasons.  Freedom of establishment allows 
EU corporations to migrate within the single market. 285   To the 
extent that controlled bankruptcy tourism is proven advantageous, 
then EU Restructuring Law should be revised to align with cross-
border conversion doctrine and tolerate this migration.286 
 
 282 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 3 (EC). 
 283 See Sections II.b.iii & II.b.iv, supra. 
 284 See Section II.b.iv, supra. 
 285  In Polbud, the CJEU recognized isolated cross-border conversions— 
commonly understood to encompass a company migrating its registered office to a 
new Member State without shifting any of its economic activity—as falling within 
the freedom of establishment’s scope.  Case C-106/16, Polbud—Wykonawstwo sp. 
z o.o., 2017 (Sup. Ct. Pol.), para. 62-63.  Member States are entitled to restrict this 
type of migration if they constitute entirely artificial arrangements designed to 
circumvent national legislation.  However, “the mere fact that a company wished 
to select the most beneficial legal system . . . does not in itself empower Member 
States to adopt restrictive measures in order to fight abuses.”  See Ariel Mucha & 
Krzysztof Oplustil, Redefining the Freedom of Establishment under EU Law as the 
Freedom to Choose the Applicable Company Law: A Discussion After the Judgment of the 
Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 25 October 2017 in Case C-106/16, Polbud, 15 EUR. 
CO. & FIN. L. REV. No. 2, 270, 298 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3100156 
[https://perma.cc/TA5F-DRM9]. 
 286 Some commentators have argued that any attempt to restrict bankruptcy 
tourism may violate the freedom of establishment.  See generally Wolf-Georg Ringe, 
Forum Shopping under the EU Insolvency Regulation 25-27 (Univ. of Oxford Legal 
Stud. Rsch. Paper No. 33/2008, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1209822 
[https://perma.cc/9W53-REYZ] (questioning the negative attitude towards forum 
shopping and suggesting that the current regime be modified to take advantage of 
beneficial forum shopping).  But see Eidenmüeller, supra note 38, at 12 n.34 (“Ringe 
does not sufficiently take into account the protection of workers and creditors in 
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The primary revision is to amend the Recast EIR’s 
conceptualization of venue and registered office.  A corporation’s 
registered office in a particular Member State should be sufficient to 
establish venue.287  The only exception to this strong presumption 
should be if the registered office was relocated to another Member 
State within the three-month period prior to the case opening.288  
The change would afford corporations flexibility while offering 
enhanced certainty to all stakeholders, easing the risk of excessive 
forum shopping, 289  and reducing the burden on the judiciary.  
Judges would no longer undertake the elaborate, real-seat inquiry 
as to “all the places in which the debtor company pursues economic 
activities and all those in which it holds assets”290—an inquiry that 
is further complicated by the requirement that the court speculate as 
to what is actually ascertainable by third parties.  The simplified 
process avoids draining judicial and stakeholder resources and 
improves case efficiency. 
 Further, Article 3 of the Recast EIR should be amended to 
provide that a debtor may rely on any of the following bases in order 
to establish that its COMI is located in a particular jurisdiction:  (i) 
the debtor has its registered office in the chosen Member State; (ii) 
the debtor’s central administration is located in the chosen Member 
State; (iii) the debtor’s principal assets are located in the chosen 
Member State; or (iv) there is a pending restructuring or insolvency 
 
interpreting freedom of establishment and its reach. I agree that abuse of law can 
only be established on a case by case basis according to the ECJ. However, Member 
States are entitled to pass general laws in order to protect imperative requirements 
in the public interest.”) (citation omitted). 
 287 As noted above, I acknowledge that the prevalent practice in the EU over 
the last few years is to file for bankruptcy only the financial holding company of a 
corporate family, keeping subsidiaries out of the process and effectuating a 
deleveraging by relying on applicable intercreditor agreements.  However, these 
types of restructuring cases fail to address many key operational and structural 
issues, representing a half measure that will not be prevalent as the current 
economic correction evolves. 
 288 This maintains the existing restriction found in the Recast EIR, Recital (40), 
and reflects the fact that restructuring planning for EU companies rarely starts more 
than six months before the commencement of a proceeding. 
 289 Naturally, regulatory arbitrage is an inveterate facet of bankruptcy tourism 
that can be minimized to bolster creditor expectations and improve predictability. 
 290 Case C-396/09, Interedil Srl (in liq.) v. Fallimento Interedil Srl, 2012 E.C.R. 
I-9939.   
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case in that Member State concerning at least one of the debtor’s 
corporate affiliates.291 
Courts should continue to be required to confirm their 
jurisdictional authority, but Article 4’s requirement that each court 
must sua sponte evaluate the basis for venue292 should be amended 
to explain that a comprehensive evaluation is only necessary if a 
motion objecting to venue has been filed by a party in interest. 
In order to support these changes, Recital (5) of the Recast EIR 
should be amended to acknowledge that internal markets will not 
function properly if regulatory incentives exist for parties to engage 
in abusive or fraudulent bankruptcy tourism. 293   In order to 
promulgate a more debtor-centric ethos, the import of Recital (28) 
should be amended to eliminate the idea that special consideration 
is given to creditors’ perception of where a debtor conducts the 
administration of its interests.  Recital (30)—which provides that the 
location of a debtor’s central administration overrides the 
presumption afforded in Article 3(1) 294 —should be eliminated 
entirely. 
I believe that these limited changes offer transformative results 
and shift the EU restructuring system to one that is more debtor-
focused, as opposed to creditor-focused.  If implemented, EU 
corporations would have far more latitude in determining venue 
and more certainty regarding case-dispositive variables.  However, 
I acknowledge that bad faith actors can exploit this new freedom.  In 
the next section, I discuss means to mitigate the risk of abusive or 
fraudulent forum shopping contaminating the system. 
 
 291 The EU will need to determine how to define “affiliate.” See supra note 245 
(quoting definition of “affiliate” that appears in 11 U.S.C. § 101). 
 292 Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 4. 
 293 The current version of the Recital targets all types of bankruptcy tourism. 
 294 Recast EIR, supra note 122. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/5
2020] The Cathedral in Another Light 265 
   
 
b.  The Darkness of Governance Mismatch and the Need for Risk 
Mitigation 
One of the primary concerns with bankruptcy tourism is that 
corporate insiders 295  will seek to locate a bankruptcy case in a 
particular jurisdiction for an improper reason; not because the 
jurisdiction will facilitate a successful restructuring but because the 
judges or substantive law in that jurisdiction may allow the insiders 
to avoid civil or criminal liability. 
Quite simply, corporations are run to maximize shareholder 
value. 296   Directors, senior officers, and other insiders—who are 
invariably shareholders as well and receive variable compensation 
based on company performance297—share in the prosperity of the 
company for which they work.  During times of corporate 
profitability, these insiders are incentivized—even without internal 
regulatory controls—to suppress self-interested conduct to the 
extent that it creates a material risk of harm to their employer.  
However, once a subject company becomes insolvent, it is often 
disadvantageous for insiders to suppress their self-interested 
conduct.  There is a high likelihood that the insiders will no longer 
want to continue their affiliation with the subject company.  At the 
same time, in many cases, these individuals could face criminal 
actions or civil penalties if a financial restructuring exposes their 
conduct to review by those with fiduciary obligations to a court or 
creditor body.  This dynamic creates what I describe as a 
“governance mismatch.”  In many cases, insiders attempt to steer a 
 
 295 The term “insider” generally refers to individuals or entities for whom 
there is a heightened risk of information asymmetries or access to financial accounts 
that can be exploited for gains at the expense of another corporate entity and its 
stakeholders.  In the United States, if the debtor is a corporation, an “insider” would 
include a “(i) director of the debtor; (ii) officer of the debtor; (iii) person in control 
of the debtor; (iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; (v) general 
partner of the debtor; [and] (vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or 
person in control of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B). 
 296 See JONATHAN MACEY, DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW 
OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 372 (13th ed. 2017). 
 297 See id. 
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distressed corporation into a particular jurisdiction in order to 
escape scrutiny or at least limit their exposure.298 
Bankruptcy tourism weaponizes governance mismatch.  
Consequently, EU Restructuring Law would need to be amended to 
specifically address cases where bad actors are fleeing to a particular 
jurisdiction to obfuscate malfeasance or otherwise disadvantage 
creditors for personal gain. 
i. Court Fiduciary with the Power to Investigate Malfeasance 
Section 1104(c) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code authorizes judges to 
appoint a fiduciary of the court—referred to as an examiner—to 
conduct an investigation of the debtor, “including an investigation 
of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, 
mismanagement, or irregularity.”299  The court determines the scope 
and funding of this investigation. 300   However, the subsection 
mandates the appointment if “(1) such appointment is in the 
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests 
of the estate; or (2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, 
 
 298 Some scholars believe that this dynamic emerged in the Enron bankruptcy 
case.  In that case, Enron’s management feared that the appointment of a chapter 11 
trustee would uncover significant corporate malfeasance.  See LoPucki, supra note 
6, at 13-14.  Enron’s management believed that if the bankruptcy case could be filed 
in the Southern District of New York, a bankruptcy judge on that bench—as 
opposed to one in the Houston bankruptcy court—would be disinclined to displace 
Enron’s management team by such an appointment.  See id.  Indeed, the standard 
for appointing a trustee in the circuit in which the S.D.N.Y. bankruptcy courts are 
located was—and continues to be—much more difficult to satisfy than the standard 
applicable to a bankruptcy court in Houston.  See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 
B.R. 164, 168 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (requiring that a showing in support of an 
appointment of a trustee must be made by clear and convincing evidence).  Enron’s 
management team was ultimately correct in their assessment.  See LoPucki, supra 
note 6, at 14-15 (“New York bankruptcy judge Arthur J. Gonzalez drew the Enron 
case. . . .  Several major creditors requested the appointment of a trustee.  Gonzalez 
delayed a hearing until he brokered a deal that left most of Enron’s management in 
place . . . .  [The] directors chosen by [Enron’s CEO] . . . remained in control of the 
company through the crucial stages of the bankruptcy case.  They resigned only 
after they too had chosen their own successors.  As a result, the [federal] 
investigators remained on the outside . . . .  For a management engaged in massive 
fraud, it was the best bankruptcy result for which one could hope.”). 
 299 11 U.S.C. 1104(c). 
 300 See id.  
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other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, 
exceed $5,000,000.”301 
Almost all Member States rely on the restructuring 
practitioner302 (“RP”) model, requiring the appointment of an RP at 
the time a restructuring case is filed.303  In some countries, the RP 
merely assumes an oversight role304 but in others the RP takes over 
some or all management authority.305  Invariably, the RP is focused 
on how the business is being run during the restructuring 
proceeding and ways to facilitate a successful reorganization to 
improve creditor recoveries.306  Some RPs consider the events that 
precipitated the bankruptcy filing, 307  but that is a secondary or 
tertiary issue.308 
The Restructuring Directive attempts to move Member States 
towards the U.S. debtor-in-possession model.  Article 5 requires 
Member States to “ensure that debtors accessing preventive 
restructuring procedures remain totally or at least partially in 
control of their assets and day-to-day operation of the business.”309  
Further, “appointment . . . of a [restructuring practitioner] shall not 
be mandatory in every case.”310  The Restructuring Directive’s shift 
 
 301 Id.  In the vast majority of cases, appointment of an examiner is not in the 
interest of stakeholders or the estate because there is no indication of malfeasance 
from which the estate can make a financial recovery, or the cost of the examiner 
would eclipse any potential recovery.  However, the second basis for appointment 
(the “$5 Million Threshold”) is satisfied in virtually all Megacases.  Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding the subsection’s language, courts that do not believe the 
appointment of an examiner is appropriate will engage in a number of practices to 
contravene the subsection, including refusing to hear an appointment motion or 
providing an examiner with an extremely limited budget and scope. 
 302  Historically, these individuals were referred to as “insolvency 
practitioners,” but the Restructuring Directive changed that nomenclature. See 
Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at Article 2(15). This Article uses the new 
terminology. 
 303 See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58. 
 304 See id.  For example, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, and Sweden.  See id. 
 305 See id. For example, Malta, Ireland, and Poland. See id. 
 306 See id. at 77-80. 
 307 See id. at 257.  For example, Italian RPs attempt to establish the cause of the 
debtor’s financial difficulties.  Id.   
 308 See id. at 256-58. 
 309 See Restructuring Directive, supra note 34, at art. 5(1). 
 310 See id. at art. 5(2).  Article 18 is relevant in this context because it requires 
Member States to enact national laws that impose various fiduciary duties on 
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to a more accommodating governance model may ultimately 
increase the risk of abusive or fraudulent tourism.  The directive 
affords existing management more autonomy, and the appointment 
of RPs is encouraged in only two extremely specific instances, 
neither of which involves insider malfeasance.311  As noted above, in 
the vast majority of Member States, RPs are afforded broad powers 
but exploring malfeasance is not a point of emphasis.312  Indeed, 
many RPs’ primary task is to achieve a successful outcome in the 
restructuring case and work with existing management to do so.  I 
argue that it is misguided to expect a party with these 
responsibilities to also take the lead in investigating management’s 
pre-filing conduct to identify malfeasance.  Housing these two 
divergent responsibilities in one office merely facilitates a 
dereliction of duty. 
I propose an amendment to the Restructuring Directive that 
would require Member States to provide for the appointment of a 
court fiduciary to investigate malfeasance and other wrongs 
committed by a debtor’s management or other insiders.  The 
protocol for appointment would diverge from U.S. bankruptcy law 
because the mandatory language of § 1104(c) coupled with a 
relatively low threshold for appointment has removed the 
judiciary’s discretion in a way that undermines the restructuring 
process.  Instead, I propose a provision to authorize courts to 
appoint a fiduciary to investigate fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, 
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity involving a debtor’s 
 
directors of a corporation facing a likelihood of insolvency.  Article 18 provides that 
“Member States shall lay down rules to ensure that, where there is a likelihood of 
insolvency, directors have the following obligations: (a) to take immediate steps to 
minimize the loss for creditors, workers, shareholders and other stakeholders; (b) 
to have due regard to the interests of creditors and other stakeholders; (c) to take 
reasonable steps to avoid insolvency; (d) to avoid deliberate or grossly negligent 
conduct that threatens the viability of business.”  Id. at art. 18.  Article 18 helps 
address the governance mismatch, but there is still a potential enforcement and 
deterrence gap in the EU. 
 311 Article 5 indicates that Member States should mandate the appointment of 
a restructuring practitioner only where (i) “the debtor is granted a general stay of 
individual enforcement actions . . . [or (ii)] the restructuring plan needs to be 
confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority by means of a cross-class cram-
down.”  Id. at art. 5. 
 312  See 2016 COMMISSION STUDY, supra note 30, at 256-58.  Note that some 
Member States do instruct restructuring practitioners to consider causes of the 
debtor’s financial collapse (e.g., Italy).  See id. at 257. 
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management if the appointment is in the interests of creditors, other 
key stakeholders, or a government body.  This provision would 
diverge from U.S. bankruptcy law by removing the $5 Million 
Threshold and authorizing an appointment if the interests of any 
prominent stakeholder group would be served by the 
appointment. 313   The court would determine the scope of the 
examiner’s investigation and the allocation of funds and resources. 
As a corollary to this provision, the EU should also encourage 
Member States to mandate aggressive action if an examiner 
identifies significant misconduct.  I propose an amendment to the 
Restructuring Directive that mandates the appointment of an RP—
assuming one has not already been appointed—to assume full 
management of a debtor if an appointed court fiduciary determines 
that the debtor’s former or current management team or insiders has 
committed fraud or other significant malfeasance.  A court may 
decline the appointment if (i) in the event a new management team 
has been appointed, this new team can establish that it has not been 
involved in the misdeeds identified by the examiner or otherwise 
influenced by the parties responsible for them; or (ii) displacement 
of management would be against the interests of prominent 
stakeholder groups. 
These new provisions would create disincentives for directors, 
officers, or insiders to attempt to forum shop in order to escape civil 
or criminal liability. 
ii. Article 33 and the Refusal to Recognize Judgements 
In truly egregious situations involving abusive or fraudulent 
forum shopping that a court fails to regulate, Article 33 of the Recast 
EIR allows other Member States to “refuse to recognize insolvency 
proceedings opened in another Member State or to enforce 
judgement handed down in the context of such proceedings where 
the effects of such recognition or enforcement would be manifestly 
contrary to that State’s public policy.”314  This threat is yet another 
check on abusive or fraudulent forum shopping.  Insiders wishing 
 
 313 11 U.S.C. § 1104(c) states that an appointment should be undertaken if all 
prominent stakeholder groups benefit from the appointment. 
 314 See Recast EIR, supra note 122, art. 33. 
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to engage in tourism to escape criminal or civil discipline for 
corporate malfeasance run the risk of undertaking a long and 
arduous process only to witness hard-fought relief secured in the 
main proceeding disregarded by other courts. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Divergent substantive restructuring laws and jurists unfamiliar 
with guiding reorganization cases are two intractable problems 
embedded in the EU’s restructuring framework.  The result is a 
system that is plagued by uncertainty and disparate treatment, 
suppressing creditor recoveries and undermining capital markets.  
This Article casts a new light on these problems.  Though often 
vilified, bankruptcy tourism is a practice with uncertain effects.  
Nevertheless, the current regulatory environment in the EU 
aggressively restricts the practice.  I argue that by doing so the EU is 
undermining its key economic policy objectives.  In fact, controlled 
bankruptcy tourism—the kind apparent in the United States—
would help create judicial hubs of optimal law and experienced 
jurists.  This assessment may appear to be overly optimistic, but this 
phenomenon has animated the U.S. bankruptcy system over the last 
thirty years.  In fact, tourism’s overall benefits may actually be 
amplified in the EU.  To that end, this Article proposes amendments 
to EU Restructuring Law that will facilitate controlled tourism while 
minimizing negative externalities that could destabilize the 
restructuring system.  
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